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Ethical Problems for Lawyers upon Trust
Terminations: Conflicts of Interest
JOEL C. DOBRIS*
Trust terminations pose ethical problems for lawyers. Benefi-
ciaries often view the trustee's lawyer as "their" lawyer. The
Code of Professional Responsibility and the recently adopted
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide little guidance in
resolving the conflicts of interest that arise in trust
terminations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The trusts and estates practice, especially trust terminations,
provide fertile ground for problems of lawyer conduct.1 Several fac-
tors, including some unique to fiduciary administration, contribute
to the abundance of ethical questions in the area. One unique fac-
tor is the nature of the fiduciary-beneficiary relationship.' During
the existence of the trust, the fiduciary must always act in the best
interest of the beneficiary.3 The relationship might be described as
symbiotic. 4 The rules of fiduciary conduct rigidly proscribe any ac-
tions by the trustee that would benefit the fiduciary at the expense
of the beneficiary. Yet, at the time of trust termination, conflict
between their interests is inherent.6 Perhaps for the first time,
their interests diverge. Now, theoretically each needs the protec-
tion of independent counsel.7 Ordinarily, the trustee is aware of
this need.8 The beneficiary, however, is more vulnerable. Just as
the beneficiary may be unaware of the new relationship with his
trustee, he may be unaware of his relationship with the trustee's
lawyer.9
Typically, a lawyer whom the beneficiaries perceive as "the
family lawyer" draws the trust.10 The fiduciary usually selects as
counsel the lawyer who drew the instrument, especially when the
trustee is a bank." The lay beneficiary continues to think of the
lawyer as "his" attorney, unaware that the lawyer presently has a
client-the trustee-whose interests replace or take precedence
over those of the family.
1
1. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER 115 (N. Galston ed. 1977).
2. See E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND
TRUSTS 251 (3d ed. 1981).
3. 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5 (3d ed. 1967).
4. J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 1384 (6th ed.
1982).
5. 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 3, § 170.
6. J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1384-86.
7. Id.; see PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 120-21; see
also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983).
8. This is certainly the case with an institutional fiduciary.
9. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 120-21.
10. Id. at 118-20.
11. J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1387.
12. Id. at 1384-86; PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 120-
21; see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983); cf. Kahn & Gallo,
The Widow's Election: A Return to Fundamentals, 24 STAN. L. REv. 531, 536 (1972) (attor-
ney's duty to advise surviving spouse in community property jurisdiction whether or not to
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Problems of more general occurrence can also arise, typically
when the lawyer represents persons with potential rather than ac-
tual conflicts of interest. For example, a lawyer may represent two
beneficiaries of the same trust, whose interests may diverge in the
future. 18 The question then becomes at what point their interests
so diverge as to require the lawyer to withdraw from representa-
tion of the trustee, the beneficiary, or both.14 That there are multi-
ple sources of guidelines to "ethical" conduct compounds the
problem.16
II. METHODS OF CONTROLLING LAWYER CONDUCT
There are several formal ways to control lawyer conduct. They
include general criminal law, specific criminal statutes dealing with
lawyer misconduct," civil liability for malpractice,1 7 disciplinary
rules prescribing minimum standards of conduct enforced by the
organized bar,"8 and nonbinding standards of desirable conduct.19
This article deals with desirable conduct-questions of profes-
sional ethics. It is not an article about professional discipline for
misconduct, although there are references to standards of profes-
sional discipline. It is certainly not an article about the crimes of
professionals. That is the stuff Professor Hazard has called "police
court jurisprudence. ' ' 0 This inquiry focuses primarily on two
codes: the current Model Code of Professional Responsibility
elect against deceased spouse's will).
13. See W. FISsmR, WHAT EVERY LAWYER KNOWS, 45-46 (1974).
14. See generally Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REv. 807 (1977).
15. Traditionally, American principles of legal ethics date from the publication of the
Sharswood lectures in 1854. See G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (Phila-
delphia 1854) (original title, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTES OF THE PRO-
FESSION OF THE LAW). This is somewhat simplistic. See A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 29 (1976). The Sharswood lectures led to the creation of the Alabama
State Bar Association Code of 1887. T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2 (2d ed. 1981). This in turn led to the original American
Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics of 1908. See Report of the Committee on
Code of Professional Ethics, TRANSACTIONS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 56 (1908). The Canons were replaced by the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility on August 12, 1969. T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra. The
ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct on August 2, 1983. It is hoped that
the states will soon follow suit.
16. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6126-6131 (West 1974).
17. See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (2d ed. 1981).
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
19. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble and Preliminary State-
ment (1981) (ethical considerations deemed "aspirational in character").
20. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 59 (1978).
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(CPR) and the newly adopted Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct ("Model Rules" or MRPC).
The Code of Professional Responsibility is a body of discipli-
nary and ethical rules promulgated by the American Bar Associa-
tion. It is currently in effect, in various forms, in many American
jurisdictions.' The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are a
controversial, proposed replacement for the CPR." It is likely that
the Model Rules will replace the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity in those states that now follow the CPR.'
This article compares the treatment under the CPR and the
Model Rules of ethics in trust terminations and discusses problems
not addressed by either set of rules. The article defines the
problems and offers solutions tailored to the actualities of this spe-
cialty practice.
2 4
21. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 221-25.
22. See, e.g., Patterson, An Analysis of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 31 MERCER L. REV. 645 (1980). The first draft of the Model Rules generated substan-
tial controversy, see, e.g., Kaufman, A Critical First Look at the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J. 1074 (1980), especially from estates lawyers. The Probate and
Trusts Division of the Real Property, Probate and Trusts Law Section of the American Bar
Association registered tentative opposition to several of the rules. There was opposition to
the first draft of Rule 1.6, which allowed division of fees between lawyers in separate firms if
each assumed joint responsibility. There was opposition to former Rule 1.9(b), which pro-
hibited an attorney from preparing a dispositive instrument giving the attorney or a mem-
ber of the attorney's family any gift; the opposition feared this provision would interfere
with the lawyer's preparing wills for members of the lawyer's own family. Discussion Draft
of Model Rules of Professional Conduct Issued by ABA Commission, PROB. & PROP., sum-
mer 1980, at 15. The author believes that the prophylactic benefits would have been worth
the inconvenience, perhaps with an exception for the immediate family.
The Proposed Final Draft of 1981 also generated controversy. See Pike & Granelli,
Ethics Code Keeps Inching Along; Will It Ever Get ABA Approval?, Nat'l L. J., Aug. 24,
1981, at 8, col. 2. The Proposed Final Draft of 1982 generated controversy also. See Winter,
Lawyer Ethics on Trial, 68 A.B.A. J. 1197-98 (1982).
23. See Winter, supra note 22.
24. The commentators have not given a great deal of consideration to ethical problems
in the trusts and estates practice. For example, the Harvard Law Review Developments
Note on lawyers' conflicts of interest omits trusts and estates from its discussion of specialty
practices. See Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94
HARv. L. REV. 1244 (1981).
Some discussion can be found in the following sources: CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCA-
TION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WILL DRAFTING 1-33 (1965); PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 221; Avery, Avoiding Liability to Nonclients in Estate and
Trust Work, 2 CAL. LAW., Feb. 1982, at 34; Casner, Estate Planning Statesmanship, 8 INST.
ON EST. PLAN. §§ 74.1200-1205 (1974); Corneel, Estate Planners: Where Do Your Loyalties
Lie?, 116 TR. & EST. 356 (1977); Eckhardt, The Estate Planning Lawyer's Problems: Mal-
practice and Ethics, 8 INST. ON EST. PLAN. V 74.600 (1974); Gallo & Haberman, Malpractice
and Conflicts in Estate Planning, 1975 INST. ON EST. PLAN. & PROB. ADM. 26; Kindregan,
Conflict of Interest and the Lawyer in Civil Practice, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 423 (1976); Martin,
Professional Responsibility and Probate Practices, 1975 WIs. L. REV. 911; McCown, Ethical
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Experience suggests that lawyers want a simple set of rules
that specify what they can and cannot do.25 It is difficult to use the
Code of Professional Responsibility," primarily because of its mix
of compulsory rules and exhortations to good conduct. The Model
Rules are simpler to use because they consist only of mandatory
rules, and because they are clearly written in a Restatement for-
mat.27 Both sets of rules, however, offer precise answers to rela-
tively few questions. More specific answers will, the author be-
lieves, eventually come from special-purpose codes promulgated by
the various specialty bars. 5 One hopes such codes will someday
supplement the more general standards in the CPR or its succes-
sor. For the near future, the answers to many questions of profes-
sional conduct will be found in articles such as this.
III. THE ATTORNEY'S DUTY IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS
One can imagine many situations creating problems of conduct
for lawyers. They need not all be resolved. It is enough to deal with
Problems in Probate Matters, 39 NEB. L. REv. 343 (1960); Midonick, Attorney-Client Con-
flicts and Confidence in Trusts and Estates, 35 Rac. A.B. Crry N.Y. 215 (1980); Miller,
Functions and Ethical Problems of the Lawyer in Drafting a Will, 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 415;
Moore, Conflicting Interests in Postmortem Planning, 9 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 111921 (1975);
Panel Discussion: Professional Ethics, 8 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 11 74.700 (1974); O'Dea, The
Lawyer-Client Relationship Reconsidered: Methods for Avoiding Conflicts of Interest, Mal-
practice Liability, and Disqualification, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 693 (1980); Report of Com-
mittee on Role and Function of Estate Lawyer, 12 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 223 (1977);
Wade, Professional Responsibility and the Estate Lawyer, 9 COLO. LAW. 1568 (1980); Note,
Trusts: Consequences of Attorney's Good Faith Representation of Adverse Parties in Trust
Administration-Potter v. Moran (Cal. 1966), 55 CAL. L. REv. 948 (1967); Comment,
Wills-Undue Influence, 50 MICH. L. Rxv. 748 (1952); Recent Cases, Professional Responsi-
bility- Will Drafting-Provisions Naming the Draftsman as Executor or Directing His Re-
tention as Attorney for the Estate, 38 Mo. L. Rzv. 321 (1973); Comment, Considerations of
Professional Responsibility in Probate Matters, 51 NRR. L. Rxv. 456 (1972); Attorney Be-
ware-The Presumption of Undue Influence and the Attorney Beneficiary, 47 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 330 (1971); Comment, Testamentary Designation of Probate Counsel, 51 TUL.
L. REv. 334 (1977); Comment, Attorney Malpractice in California: The Liability of a Law-
yer Who Drafts an Imprecise Contract or Will, 24 UCLA L. REv. 422 (1976); Case Com-
ment, Legal Ethics-Drafter of a Will Who Serves as Executor, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 190
(1972).
25. See generally Wydick, Trial Counsel as a Witness: The Code and Model Rules, 15
U.C.D. L. REv. 651 (1982).
26. See G. HAZARD, supra note 20, at 7.
27. Lawyers are not alone in seeking simpler codes of ethics. The American Medical
Association has enacted a new "simpler" code. See Reinhold, A.M.A., Facing Legal Pres-
sures, Adopts Less Rigid Code for Doctors, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1980, at Al, col. 4.
28. See Martin, supra note 24 (discussing Statement of Principles Regarding Probate
and Practices and Expenses adopted by the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law of the American Bar Association).
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the most pressing of these ethical questions and to rely on the pat-
terns of resolution to provide useful models for resolving other
problems.
An introductory word about the nature of trust relationships
may be helpful. A trustee is one who holds legal title to property
for the benefit of another-the beneficiary.29 The trustee receives
compensation for discharging his responsibilities as fiduciary 0 and
is liable if he fails to meet a minimum standard of fiduciary con-
duct."1 On appropriate occasions the fiduciary presents a record of
his acts to the beneficiary and seeks a release from all liability for
the period covered by the record.32 Typically, the trustee requests
some or all of his compensation at that time." More specifically,
the trustee presents a detailed financial account3 4 as well as a sepa-
rate document in narrative form describing major events in the ad-
ministration of the trust. The document also effectuates the settle-
ment of the account."
A. Preparation of the Fiduciary's Account
The first step in obtaining approval and release is the prepara-
tion of an account in the form customarily used in the jurisdiction.
The account details all the trustee's acts since the last account or
since the inception of the trust.36 Trustees account as required by
law, custom, or circumstance. Trustees in some jurisdictions may
be required to account periodically.3 7 This usually is so for trustees
of testamentary trusts in the more traditional jurisdictions. Such
accounts, if ex parte, are frequently not binding.33 The following
circumstances may require that the trustee present an account: the
death of a beneficiary, the death of a trustee, a partial payout of
29. 1 A. Scorr, supra note 3, § 2.3.
30. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 2309 (McKinney 1967).
31. See, e.g., Surcharge Litigation and How to Avoid It, 16 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
715 (1981) (discussion of hypothetical cases).
32. 1A W. NOSSMAN & J. WYATT, TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND TAXATION § 27.26[2] (2d
ed. rev. 1981).
33. A. LORING, A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK § 22, at 81, § 66 (6th ed. 1962).
34. Id. § 22.
35. For an example of a petition closing a fiduciary's account, see E. MILLER, A PRACTI-
cAL GUIDE TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF NEW YORK ESTATES 318 (1969). For an example of a
trustee's account, see id. at 318. For a discussion of the nonjudicial settlement of accounts,
see Westfall, Nonjudicial Settlement of Trustees' Accounts, 71 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1957).
36. A. LORING, supra note 33, §§ 22, 23.
37. Id. § 22.
38. See In re Enger's Will, 225 Minn. 229, 30 N.W.2d 694 (1948). See generally Kehoe,
Allowance of Probate Accounts, 59 MASS. L.Q. 315 (1975).
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trust principal after passage of a number of years, the termination
of the trust."'
Suggesting the Preparation of the Account. When there is a
preexisting relationship between the trustee and his lawyer, the
lawyer may suggest the preparation of an account. This suggestion
usually does not create the problem of solicitation.' e
Who Prepares the Account? Once the trustee decides to
render an account, the trustee, the lawyer, or a third party can
prepare the account. Though some commercial fiduciaries may pre-
pare their own accounts, most commercial and virtually all individ-
ual trustees rely on the lawyer."
(a) Confidentiality. The preparation of fiduciary ac-
counts is complex. Therefore, nonspecialists may wish to refer such
matters to an outside preparer.'2 While an attorney has a duty to
keep a client's affairs confidential, intraoffice referral does not
breach this duty, even if the client is not informed.4' Referral
outside the office may also be made without the approval of the
client. This is not a breach of the attorney's duty to preserve the
confidences of the client, when made for legitimate purposes."
(b) Who Bears the Cost of Preparing the Account? As-
suming that the fiduciary refers the account to the lawyer, the
question becomes whether the trustee, the lawyer, or the benefi-
ciary should absorb the cost of the preparation. If the account is
done outside the lawyer's office, there is a preparer's bill to be
paid. If done within the firm, there are office costs to be allocated.
This is not directly a question of proper conduct, but it is relevant
to the discussion. There are three possibilities: the cost can be ab-
sorbed by the trustee out of his commission; the cost can be ab-
sorbed by the lawyer out of her'" fee; or the cost can be absorbed
by the trust (and ultimately by the beneficiaries) as an expense of
39. G. BOGERT & D. OAKS, CASES AND TEXT ON THE LAw OF TRUSTS 483 (5th ed. 1978).
40. An attorney may call the attention of a former or a present client to a change in law
relevant to the former or present engagement and accept employment arising from the con-
tact. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmLrrY DR 2-104(A)(2) (1981).
41. A. LORING, supra note 33, § 21 at 77, § 22. See generally 2 A. Scorr, supra note 3, §
172.
42. That specialist may be a lawyer, a certified public accountant, a "fiduciary account-
ant" trained by apprenticeship, or even a moonlighting employee of a bank trust
department.
43. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment (1983).
44. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmiLrry EC 4-3 (1981); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
45. The feminine personal pronoun will be used throughout this article to refer to the
lawyer.
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administration.
Trustees receive fees for performing their duties. Lawyers re-
ceive fees for representing trustees. Trustees' fees, or commissions,
and lawyers' fees are not uniform."" They are sometimes set by the
instrument,'7 sometimes by custom, and sometimes by judicial rule
or statute.4" Trustees' commissions and legal fees are usually a
small percentage of the principal of the trust for which the account
is prepared. ' Lawyers often do not make fee adjustments even
though a particular trust requires more or less work than other
trusts."
Although it is not easy to make generalizations in this area
because of the differences among and within jurisdictions, it ap-
pears that the lawyer usually is expected to prepare the account
and to absorb the cost out of her fee." This expectation has impli-
cations for the proper conduct of both the trustee and his lawyer.
A trustee who pays a full customary fee to his attorney plus an
additional fee to an outside accountant might well be committing a
breach of trust in the ordinary situation.2 He may, however, be
justified in paying an extra fee under special circumstances, e.g.,
when a particular accountant is familiar with the complicated
problems of a closely held business."
The lawyer also may find herself constrained by the usual
practice. Since an attorney has a duty to charge no more than a
reasonable fee, the lawyer who charges a full customary fee without
preparing an account may well be acting improperly.' It seems un-
likely, however, that she would be disciplined in the absence of
egregious circumstances." The very lack of certainty concerning
both customary fees in fiduciary situations and the services to be
46. See generally Martin, supra note 24.
47. See UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, TRUST & WILL PROVISIONS i-Vi
(1981).
48. See, e.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 2309 (Consol. 1967).
49. G. BOGERT & D. OAKS, supra note 39, at 499-503.
50. Martin, supra note 24, at 924; see Report of the Committee on Administration &
Distribution of Decedents' Estates, Fiduciary and Probate Counsel Fees in the Wake of
Goldfarb, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 238 (1978). See generally Eubank, The Future for
Estate Lawyers, 10 id. 223, 230-32 (1975).
51. See Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 745,
748 (1972).
52. See 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 3, § 242.2.
53. See id.
54. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-17 (1981).
55. See T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at 152-55.
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performed for the fee provides protection from discipline."
B. Settlement of the Fiduciary's Account
After the fiduciary has prepared the account, it must be
presented to the person with the power to approve it. Ordinarily,
this is the beneficiary. 57 Depending on the jurisdiction and the cir-
cumstances, the settlement will be either judicial (formal) or non-
judicial (informal)."
Judicial Accountings. A judicial account is, at least in form, a
full-fledged adversary proceeding. 9 The beneficiary is served with
a petition, a copy of the fiduciary's account, and an order to show
cause why the account should not be settled.10 The beneficiary has
an opportunity to retain a lawyer and to appear and contest the
account.6 If the beneficiary fails to contest the account, it will be
settled by default, and the fiduciary will be released from all liabil-
ity for acts fully disclosed in the account and petition.6"
Theoretically, a properly prepared petition and account pro-
vide full disclosure of the fiduciary's acts and make it clear to the
beneficiary that the proceeding is one in which substantial sums of
money may be at stake.63 In truth, such instruments are often ex-
tremely complicated and difficult for nonspecialists to under-
stand.6"
A fiduciary's account may be settled judicially rather than in-
formally for several reasons, including the following:
(1) The jurisdiction may require, by either law or custom,
that fiduciary accounts be settled judicially."'
(2) Court approval may be required when a beneficiary is
unable to release the fiduciary effectively. For example, a benefi-
56. See Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, supra note 51, at 745.
57. The statement in the text is a simplification. The person with the power to approve
the account could be the trustee of a continuing trust or a person given the power to settle
the trustee's account. See Westfall, supra note 35, at 74-76.
58. See J. RITCHE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1382.
59. See Whitman, National Fiduciary Accounting Study, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
467, 469, 476 (1972); see also Westfall, supra note 35, at 41.
60. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1138.4 (Deering 1981).
61. J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1382-85.
62. Westfall, supra note 35.
63. See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1382-85.
64. See A Baker's Dozen Topics, 10 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 243, 259-61 (1975). The
adoption of a simplified and uniform account may well lead to increased understanding of
fiduciary accounts by both lawyers and laypersons. See Whitman, supra note 59.
65. See Limiting Future Actions After Trust Account Approval, 2 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 503 (1967); see also G. BOGERT & D. OAKS, supra note 39; Westfall, supra note 35.
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ciary might be legally incompetent because of age or mental
incapacity. 6
(3) The fiduciary may need a judicial construction of the
instrument or instructions respecting the proper exercise of a
management power.
6 7
(4) There may be so many beneficiaries that it is more effi-
cient to use the judicial process to settle the account than to
arrange an informal settlement.
(5) The beneficiaries may be contentious, or the account
may show some less-than-perfect act by the fiduciary. In such
cases, the fiduciary may seek the protection of a judicial
proceeding.6"
A judicial settlement provides protection for the trustee, be-
cause the beneficiary will find it almost impossible to set aside a
judicial settlement of the account as to matters set forth therein in
the customary manner." If properly served with the documents in
the proceeding, the beneficiary will be unable later to make claims
such as one of misrepresentation by the accounting trustee. Our
judicial system prevents a court from later providing relief for the
beneficiary who was properly served with a petition and account
that provided full disclosure as defined under local law."0
Informal Accountings. Informal settlement of an account oc-
curs without using the courts.71 A full spectrum of possible infor-
mal settlements exists. At one extreme is the presentation of a sta-
tionery store form without an account, purporting to release all
claims. At the other extreme is the presentation of a complete ac-
count in the judicially required form, with an extensive document,
often called a "receipt and release", that is as detailed as a judicial
petition. 2 In most jurisdictions the latter type of informal account
fully protects a fiduciary in appropriate circumstances.7 3 That is, a
fiduciary is protected when he makes full disclosure, the benefi-
66. See, e.g., Spicer v. Wright, 215 Va. 520, 211 S.E.2d 79 (1975).
67. See G. BOGERT & D. OAKS, supra note 39, at 567-68. A trustee might need instruc-
tion as to the allocation of receipts and expenditures in a particular situation. Courts will
entertain such petitions, although they will not exercise a fiduciary's discretionary powers.
See, e.g., Spicer v. Wright, 215 Va. 520, 211 S.E.2d 79 (1975).
68. See Limiting Future Actions After Trust Account Approval, supra note 65.
69. See id.
70. See In re Enger's Will, 225 Minn. 229, 30 N.W.2d 694 (1948).
71. See Westfall, supra note 35.
72. See Fleming, Settlement of Trustee's Account Without Court Proceedings, 5 INST.
ON EST. PLAN. 1 71.600-.601 (1971). A form of receipt and release can be found at 27
CARMODY-WAIT 2D, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE § 166:9 (1968).
73. See, e.g., In re James' Estate, 86 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
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ciary has capacity to and does understand the account, and there
are no collateral issues of overreaching or the like. A release with
no account or with an incomplete account is not sufficient, because
a release is ordinarily not effective without full disclosure.74
Informal settlements have much to recommend them:
(1) they usually take less lawyer time and are thus more effi-
cient;78  (2) they usually can be settled more quickly;7' and
(3) they do not become part of the public record."
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The essential problem of lawyer conduct in the settlement of
fiduciary accounts is the conflict of interest between the trustee
and the beneficiary. Professors Ritchie, Alford, and Effiand have
described the problem thusly:
The fiduciary's duty is normally to protect his beneficiary
(the heirs or devisees of a decedent's estate, the incapacited per-
son in the conservatorship, the beneficiaries of a trust). Yet at
the point of obtaining private or judicial approval of accounts
the fiduciary's personal interest is in conflict. He wants his ac-
counts approved without question; he no longer represents the
beneficiary and the latter must look out for himself. The prob-
lem is how the beneficiary can best be protected in an account-
ing proceeding. Should the court exercise a supervisory role and
actively audit the account? Should the beneficiary be expected
to retain his own legal counsel? Does the lawyer retained by the
fiduciary but paid out of the estate owe a duty to the benefi-
ciaries or only to the fiduciary? (At present there is a surprising
diversity of professional opinion on this point; see Whitman, Re-
port of the National Fiduciary Accounting Study (1972) pp. 59-
67). If the lawyer learns from the fiduciary that the latter has
prepared a fraudulent account, can he reveal this to the court?
If the lawyer merely realizes that the account includes question-
able items, can and should he inform the beneficiary? Should
there be a requirement that every account be approved by a
court-appointed CPA? If the beneficiary is incompetent (as usu-
ally is the case in guardianship or conservatorship), should a
guardian ad litem be appointed to protect the incompetent's in-
terest? Protection may be costly and unnecessary. There is no
74. 27 CARMODY-WAIT 2D, supra note 72, § 166:11; 28 id. § 170:92.
75. See generally Martin, Justice and Efficiency Under a Model of Estate Settlement,
66 VA. L. REv. 727 (1980).
76. 27 CARMODY-WAIT 2D, supra note 72, § 166:8.
77. Id.
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simple answer. The Uniform Probate Code is drafted on the pre-
mise that the beneficiary should look after his own interest ex-
cept in conservatorships; the court is not expected to exercise a
supervisory function."'
There are several ways of analyzing conflicts of interest in the
area of professional responsibility. Much has been written about
the problem," but it may be useful to restate the basic pattern of
analysis.
A. A General Analysis
A lawyer has an obligation to avoid conflicts of interest.80 That
is, a lawyer must not let anything interfere with her loyalty to her
client or her independent professional judgment." The 1908 Ca-
nons of Professional Ethics forbade the attorney's representing
conflicting interests without the express consent of the clients after
full disclosure.8 The Canons have been replaced by the CPR,
which may ultimately be replaced by the Model Rules. Each of
these successive sets of guidelines for lawyer conduct treats con-
flicts of interest somewhat differently.8" The CPR takes the view
that the issue is one of loyalty and requires undivided loyalty to
the client on the part of the attorney." The Model Rules treat con-
flicts of interest as problems of direct adversity or as problems that
adversely affect the quality of representation a client receives.88
There are essentially three kinds of conflicts of interest: (1)
conflicts between multiple clients; (2) conflicts between the lawyer
and the client; and (3) conflicts between the client and a third
78. J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1394.
79. See, e.g., H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF
LAW (1978); Aronson, supra note 14; Corneel, supra note 24; Midonick, supra note 24; Mor-
gan, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Client in the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 993; Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest
in the Legal Profession, supra note 24. The Twentieth Century Fund recently sponsored a
series of book-length studies of conflicts of interest in various areas. C. WELLES, CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST: NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS (1977). Excellent bibliographies can be found in the
footnotes to the Harvard Developments Note, Developments in the Law-Conflicts of In-
terest in the Legal Profession, supra note 24, and in the appendix to Mr. O'Dea's article,
O'Dea, supra note 24, at 741-44.
80. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-14 (1981).
81. Patterson, supra note 22, at 656. See generally Aronson, supra note 14.
82. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1908).
83. See generally T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 15.
84. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1981) and the attend-
ant ethical considerations and disciplinary rules.
85. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
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party. 6 A conflict of interest may be potential or actual;87 if actual,
it may be insubstantial or substantial.8 " Moreover, the substantial-
ity of a conflict will be a function of the importance one attaches to
the underlying policy of requiring attorneys to avoid conflicts of
interest.8 9
1. POLICIES SERVED BY BARRING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The rule that the attorney-client relationship should be as free
as possible of conflicts of interest serves several policies.90 First, a
cornerstone of our Judeo-Christian culture is that one must be du-
tiful" and loyal to those to whom one is bound.2 No article on
conflicts of interest is complete without the obligatory quote from
Matthew exhorting the reader to serve but one master: "No man
can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the
other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye
cannot serve God and mammon."' Moreover, under principles of
Anglo-American jurisprudence a fiduciary has a duty of undivided
loyalty to his or her beneficiary. 4 A no less obligatory quote from
Chief Judge Cardozo's opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon95 expresses
this duty:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undi-
vided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular
exceptions. 6
It is a commonplace that an attorney has a fiduciary relationship
86. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1981).
87. See id. EC 5-3, EC 5-15.
88. See id. DR 5-105.
89. See Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra
note 24, at 1244, 1251-84.
90. See id.
91. See E. BODENHEIMER, PHILOSOPHY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
92. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 516-20 (5th ed. 1956).
93. Matthew 6:24 (King James).
94. 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 3, § 170.
95. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
96. Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
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with her client.9 7 The term "fiduciary relationship" is an umbrella
that covers a variety of relationships between persons and as to
property." A fiduciary must put the interests of the beneficiary
first and in the event of misconduct is subject to the powers of the
equity courts."9
The second policy reason for avoiding conflicts of interest is
our society's reliance on the adversary system. 00 An adversary sys-
tem is based on fealty of the advocate to her client, and the ulti-
mate threat to the system is disloyalty. 101 An adversary system
must incorporate safeguards against divided loyalty.
1 0 2
Third, conflicts of interest can interfere with the rendering of
legal services. The model of attorney professionalism is the cool,
detached lawyer advising her client competently and compassion-
ately. Both the office lawyer and the litigator need to avoid intru-
sions on the lawyer-client relationship. Interests that compete with
those of the client can seriously interrupt the attorney's delivery of
legal services.
Fourth, lawyers wish to maintain the confidence of the public
for reasons of gain, pride, and efficiency.0 3 Conflicts of interest se-
riously undermine public confidence in the legal process and in the
bar. Therefore, the CPR deals not only with actual conflicts of in-
terest, but also With situations that create even the appearance of
conflicting interests. Canon 9 of the CPR exhorts the lawyer to
avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
Lawyers and the legal system function best if clients feel free
to discuss matters fully with their attorneys.'0 Several rules rele-
vant to the attorney-client relationship take this into account.0 ,
For example, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to en-
courage frank discussion.'"0 Any rule that fosters client confidence
contributes to maximizing the effectiveness of the legal system.
97. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1981).
98. See 1 A. SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.5.
99. E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, supra note 2, at 7-9.
100. See generally M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
101. See generally Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Pro-
fession, supra note 24.
102. See id.
103. Public confidence contributes to the efficient functioning of our legal system and
our society. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble and Preliminary
Statement (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
104. L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 277 (1971);
105. See Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 986 (1973).
106. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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Control of conflicts of interest inspires client confidence in the in-
dividual lawyer and in the system.
As society becomes more complex,0 7 we become more con-
cerned with eliminating injustice and imperfection. 0 8 Lawyers
have become increasingly aware of the conflict problem. 10 9 Unfor-
tunately, one of the effects of this awareness is complexity.1 0 The
classic solution when there is a conflict of interest is to bring in
another lawyer. This inevitably increases the cost of the transac-
tion; it may also leave the client feeling, at best, like a victim of
overregulation and, at worst, like a victim of a sinister plot to in-
crease lawyers' incomes.1 '
2. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN MULTIPLE CLIENTS
The trusts and estates area is rife with potential and actual
conflicts of interest, most frequently between multiple clients of a
single attorney."12 Fiduciaries' and beneficiaries' interests often di-
verge. The reports are full of cases demonstrating fiduciary-benefi-
ciary disagreement.1 s The interests of beneficiaries are also often
dissimilar. What is good for the income beneficiary may be bad for
the principal beneficiary.1 4 The interests of multiple fiduciaries
are not always the same, especially when the trust instrument gives
them separate duties." 5 The fiduciary who is one of several benefi-
ciaries may have interests that are different from those of the
other beneficiaries. The lawyer may knowingly or accidentally find
herself representing these conflicting interests."'
3. THE CPR APPROACH
The CPR deals with conflicts of interest in an unstructured
and sometimes frustrating manner. Relevant statements are dis-
persed throughout the Code in various Canons, Ethical Considera-
107. See generally F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920).
108. Compare Symposium: The Quest for Equality, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, with Westen,
The Empty Idea of Equality, 94 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
109. See generally .G. HAZARD, supra note 79.
110. See id. at 109; Kaplan, Representation of Multiple Clients, 62 A.B.A. J. 648
(1976); The One-Lawyer Divorce, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 25, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
111. See Kaplan, supra note 110, at 648.
112. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER supra note 1, at 115.
113. See, e.g., Mueller v. Mueller, 28 Wis. 2d 26, 135 N.W.2d 854 (1965).
114. See, e.g., In re Catherwood's Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961).
115. See The Co-Trustee Relationship-Rights and Duties, 8 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 9 (1973).
116. See Midonick, supra note 24.
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tions ("ECs") and Disciplinary Rules ("DRs"). The main Canons
addressing the issue are Canons 4, 5 and 9:
Canon 4: "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and
Secrets of a Client."
Canon 5: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Profes-
sional Judgment on Behalf of a Client."
Canon 9: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of
Professional Impropriety."
Canon 5 is the major source of the rules concerning conflicts of
interest. The Canon seeks to maximize a lawyer's loyalty to the
client and to protect the attorney-client relationship against intru-
sions interfering with the lawyer's exercise of professional judg-
ment. Problems involving multiple clients are covered by Ethical
Considerations 5-14 through 5-20. EC 5-14 affirms the CPR's com-
mitment to disinterested judgment and undiluted loyalty. It as-
sumes that judgment and loyalty are in peril whenever multiple
clients have "differing" interests, defined as interests that are
"conflicting, inconsistent, diverse or otherwise discordant." EC 5-
14, like all ECs, defines a goal of conduct rather than a minimum
standard of conduct," 7 and precludes the acceptance or continua-
tion of employment that will adversely affect judgment or loyalty.
Taken alone, EC 5-14 leaves to the lawyer the decision to refuse
employment or to withdraw. The criterion for the decision to re-
fuse employment or to withdraw is whether or not the lawyer's ca-
pacity to act will be diminished.
EC 5-15 seeks to guide the conscientious lawyer who faces
what the CPR calls "potentially differing interests."" 8 The lawyer
is urged to treat uncertain situations as requiring remedial action.
EC 5-15 then states in mandatory terms that, in litigation, a law-
yer should never represent multiple clients with differing interests
and should only rarely represent multiple clients with potentially
differing interests. The prohibitory tone of EC 5-15 is inappropri-
ate, because the Ethical Considerations were drafted to describe
ideal rather than required conduct. 119 At any rate, the distinction
is academic; the EC merely reiterates the binding prohibition
117. This article is primarily about ethical conduct. The CPR deals with both ideal
conduct and minimum conduct. The Model Rules deal only with minimum conduct. If that
minimum conduct standard is not met, the lawyer will be disciplined.
118. The use of the word "potentially" suggests by negative inference that once inter-
ests actually diverge a different result must obtain. See Appendix A to this article.




against such conduct found in DR 5-105. EC 5-15 permits the rep-
resentation of potentially differing interests in nonlitigation situa-
tions. As will be seen, this distinction is not particularly helpful in
the area of fiduciary administration. 120 EC 5-15 also allows presen-
tation of multiple clients in nonlitigation situations where their in-
terests "vary only slightly."
Thus there appear to be three categories of conflicts: differing
interests, interests that vary only slightly, and potentially differing
interests. Within these categories, permissible conduct varies de-
pending upon whether or not the representation involves litigation.
The following table states the basic CPR structure for dealing with
conflicts between clients. A more complete table is set forth as an
appendix to this article.
Propriety of Propriety of Propriety of
representing representing representing
differing potentially differ- interests which
interests ing interests vary only slightly
Litigation Never Rarely, if ever Rarely, if ever
Non-
Litigation Rarely, Often Often
if ever
When a lawyer permissibly represents differing interests, EC
5-16 requires that the attorney fully inform her clients. Each client
must consent to the representation after a full explanation. EC 5-
17 catalogs situations in which potentially differing interests are
likely to arise. It mentions, as one example, a lawyer representing
multiple beneficiaries of an estate. The EC offers little specific
guidance. It suggests the need for case-by-case analysis and reiter-
ates the policy goal that there be no adverse effect on the lawyer's
judgment. 2'
EC 5-19 states the obvious-that a lawyer may represent mul-
tiple clients when their interests are the same. Logically, this EC
should precede the other ECs in the group, and it is startling to
find this elementary principle stated after more complicated mat-
ters. The positive statement does not support a negative inference
that a lawyer may not represent differing interests. Having ap-
120. See infra text accompanying notes 251-52.
121. EC 5-18 states that the lawyer for an entity owes allegiance to the entity and not
to persons associated with the entity, such as officers and directors. Traditionally, this rule
is not applied to trusts and estates. The lawyer's duty of loyalty is owed to the fiduciary and
not to the trust entity. To do otherwise would make the lawyer an attorney for the benefi-
ciaries, since it is they who are the equitable owners of the trusts "entity." Cf. MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983).
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proved the representation of similar interests, the EC cautions law-
yers to think like clients-to identify the similar interests that will
appear dissimilar-and then to explain to the client why the ap-
pearance of conflict is false. This advice does not address the real-
ity of the trusts and estates practice.12 Clients do not often detect
false conflicts and demand their own lawyers. More often, the
problem is convincing the client (and sometimes the lawyer) that a
real conflict exists that requires withdrawal or separate
representation.
EC 5-19 concludes with a requirement that a lawyer must al-
ways withdraw when a client perceives a conflict, without regard to
the existence of an actual conflict. Since a client can always fire his
lawyers, the need for the statement is unclear.
123
EC 5-20 closes this series of ECs by narrowly approving the
lawyer's serving as an impartial arbitrator or mediator in matters
involving present or former clients. To comply with the CPR, the
lawyer must provide full disclosure prior to acting and must for-
swear representation of any of the parties in the matter afterward.
EC 5-20 is of no particular interest in fiduciary matters, because it
blesses only arbitration and mediation. That approval cannot be
expanded to cover the representation of differing interests. 12 4 EC
5-20's prohibition of further representation of the disputing parties
makes this clear.
The Disciplinary Rules set mandatory guidelines. 12 Under Ca-
non 5, the key rule is DR 5-105.126 It requires a lawyer, on pain of
discipline, to decline or withdraw from employment if her exercise
of professional judgment will be, or is likely to be, adversely af-
fected or if the employment will likely involve the lawyer in repre-
senting differing interests. There is an exception to the rule. The
lawyer may represent multiple clients when it is "obvious" that the
representation of each will be adequate, and if each consents after
full disclosure.12 7 Interestingly enough, nothing is said directly in
122. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 115.
123. This is recognized in the comment to the first draft Model Rule 5.2. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.2 comment (Discussion Draft 1980).
124. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Introduction to Rules 5.1-.2 (Discus-
sion Draft 1980); Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683
(1965).
125. See supra note 119.
126. The lawyer who wishes to know what she can and cannot do must turn to DR 5-
105; it contains the relevant prohibitions on lawyer conduct and the exceptions thereto.
127. Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra
note 24, at 1292-306.
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the Disciplinary Rule about the permissibility of representing dif-
fering interests; it is presumed that the representation of signifi-
cantly differing interests always impairs the lawyer's professional
judgment.
Obviously, the CPR provides a somewhat tortured system for
dealing with conflicts of interest between multiple clients. Under
the CPR, the lawyer who wishes to avoid punishment (1) accepts
or continues no representation where her professional judgment
will be, or is likely to be, affected; and (2) accepts or continues no
representation involving actual or potential conflicts of interest un-
less (a) it is obvious that she can adequately represent all interests,
and (b) all clients have consented after full disclosure.
This ostensible exception in DR 5-105 to the no-conflicts rule
loses its apparent importance in the face of EC 5-15. Since EC 5-15
states that a lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple
clients with actually differing interests, it becomes "obvious" under
DR 5-105 that adequate representation is impossible.
The risk of representing potentially differing interests in liti-
gation is that the potential conflict will ripen into an actual con-
flict. A lawyer must be careful, therefore, in representing multiple
beneficiaries in a litigated trust termination. For example, a lawyer
should not represent both the estate of the deceased life tenant
and the remainder beneficiary if the claim involves allocation of
receipts and expenditures between income and principal. 128 Agree-
ing to represent both parties without knowing what the account
shows carries a real potential for conflict. Agreeing to represent
multiple beneficiaries against a trustee who has stolen trust assets,
however, would involve no unusual problems of allocation, and
would be proper.
Canons 4 and 9, and the DRs and ECs thereunder, also deal
with conflicts of interest. Canon 4 requires the attorney to preserve
her client's confidences and secrets, a specific component of the
general duty of loyalty. A loyal attorney does not reveal her client's
confidences and secrets. Secrecy and confidentiality enhance the
lawyer-client relationship and aid the functioning of the legal sys-
tem.129 While the subject matter of the trusts and estates practice
is particularly personal and sensitive, the application of Canon 4 to
that area is quite straightforward.
128. See, e.g., In re Catherwood's Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961).
129. L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 104. See generally Crystal, Confidenti-
ality Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 215 (1982).
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Canon 9 exhorts the lawyer to avoid even the appearance of
impropriety. A catchall provision of the CPR, its policy goal is to
foster public confidence in the bar.180 Canon 9 speaks directly to
several situations giving rise to apparent or, arguably, even to ac-
tual conflicts of interest as well as to other inappropriate acts. It
also sets standards for dealing with client property. Canon 9 actu-
ally contributes little and merits no further discussion here.
4. THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are preferable in
many ways to the CPR' and for several reasons are easier to ap-
ply. First, the Model Rules consist almost exclusively of duties
rather than recommendations.I32 Guides to superior conduct, such
as the ECs, are gone. Though helpful in theory, the aspirational
guidelines of the ECs are complicated, confusing, and detract from
the usefulness of the CPR.3 3 Dropping them is wise.134 Second, the
language of the Model Rules is clearer than that of the CPR.
Third, the organization of the Model Rules makes them easier to
use. They employ the Restatement format familiar to most law-
yers. 3 5 A glance at the table of contents provides orientation for
the lawyer confronting a problem. Fourth, the commentary demon-
strates a realistic understanding of the practical problems faced by
lawyers. 36 It acknowledges the complexity of the lawyer's role in
our society and the impossibility of promulgating general or spe-
cific rules to cover all situations.
1 3 7
Rule 1.7. The primary tool for dealing with conflicts of interest
is Rule 1.7. The Rule reads in its entirety,
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representa-
tion of that client will be directly adverse to another client,
unless:
130. Aronson, supra note 14, at 810-11.
131. Brown & Dauer, Professional Responsibility in Nonadversarial Lawyering: A Re-
view of The Model Rules, 1982 A.B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 519.
132. Kutak, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Ethical Standards for the '80s and
Beyond, 67 A.B.A. J. 1116, 1117 (1981).
133. Id.
134. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Chairman's Introduction (Proposed
Final Draft 1981).
135. Id.
136. Kutak, supra note 132, at 1120.
137. Not all lawyers are happy with the Model Rules. For example, the Rules have been
attacked by the New York County Lawyers' Association. See Kohn, County Lawyers' Board
Opposed to Final Draft of ABA Code, N.Y.L.J., June 22, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
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(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representa-
tion will not adversely affect the relationship with the
other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representa-
tion of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's re-
sponsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representa-
tion will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation
of the implications of the common representation and
the advantages and risks involved.
The major policies behind the Rule are protecting the lawyer's
independent professional judgment and protecting her loyalty to
her client.13 8 The Model Rules, like the CPR, acknowledge that the
major threats to independent judgment are the lawyer's responsi-
bilities to other clients and third persons and the lawyer's own in-
dividual interests. 89
The Model Rules do not preclude representation of clients
with conflicting interests in all cases-only in those where there is
direct adversity,14 0 or where the conflict would "materially inter-
fere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment" or
"foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on
behalf of the client."'  The comment to Rule 1.7 states that a cli-
ent may choose to ignore either a potential or actual conflict of
interest.14 2 If, however, a disinterested lawyer would conclude that
the client should not agree to the representation, then the lawyer
whose services were sought may not ask the client to consent and
must refuse to represent the client.'4
Rule 1.7 defines two kinds of conflicts between clients. Para-
graph (a) of Rule 1.7 focuses on direct adversity between clients
and establishes a standard for accepting representation of a new
client or representation of a present client in a new matter. The
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lawyer must reject the representation if it is "directly adverse" to
the interests of another client (who might be called the "senior"
client), unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that she may un-
dertake the representation, and (2) the affected clients consent af-
ter "consultation." Rule 1.7(a), designed to protect the "senior"
client, is narrow in its effect because it addresses only situations of
direct adversity.
Paragraph (b) of Rule 1.7 focuses on what might be called the
"junior" relationship. The lawyer must reject the junior relation-
ship if the representation may be "materially limited by the law-
yer's responsibilities to another client," unless (1) the lawyer rea-
sonably believes that she can undertake the representation, and (2)
the junior client consents after consultation.
Rule 1.7(b) is broader in scope than 1.7(a). Its standard of ma-
terial limitation allows lawyers to accept multiple clients whose in-
terests are not in perfect harmony. Rule 1.7(a) has the same per-
missive effect, because it affects only the narrow category of
situations where there is direct adversity. Thus, taken together, the
two parts of Rule 1.7 allow lawyers to accept multiple clients with
conflicting interests in many situations.
Moreover, if a proposed representation runs afoul of the initial
limitations of Rule 1.7, it still may be allowed with the client's con-
sent after consultation. The term "consultation" first appeared in
the June 1982 version of the MRCP. It is defined in the terminol-
ogy section as "communication of information reasonably sufficient
to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in
question.""1 ' This definition presumably applies in Rule 1.7(a).
Consultation is given a more definite meaning in 1.7(b)(2), the sit-
uation in which the common representation falls within the "mate-
rially limited" definition and involves "multiple clients in a single
matter." In that context 'consultation is defined as including, at a
minimum, "explanation of the implications of the common repre-
sentation and the advantages and risks involved."' One hopes
that the general definition of consultation will be interpreted as
stringently as the more specific definition in 1.7(b)(2).
1 46
144. Id. preamble. The term "consultation" is defined in a manner substantially similar
to the term "disclosure" as used in the 1981 Proposed Final Draft of the Model Rules and
which has been omitted from the Rules as adopted.
145. Id. Rule 1.7(b).
146. The general definition of consultation might be applied differently under 1.7(a)




The comment to Rule 1.7 deals with conflicts in litigation by
stating that under the Rule a lawyer may not represent adversaries
in litigation.1 47 The comment also discusses the representation of
parties on the same side of litigation and forbids representing
them when their positions are incompatible or when there are
"substantially different possibilities of settlement. 1 4 The negative
inference is clear that if the interests are not substantially differ-
ent, then common representation is possible. For example, a lawyer
could not represent both income and principal beneficiaries if the
question were one of allocation of receipts or expenditures between
income and principal, 4 9 but the same lawyer could represent both
if they were generally discontented with the trustee's investment
147. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983). The 1981 version of
the Model Rules applied this prohibition only to contentious litigation. There was a strong
negative inference that a lawyer could represent nominal adversaries in noncontentious liti-
gation. Thus, the notes to that version stated that a lawyer could represent only nominally
opposed parties "who seek the same judgment and whose interests are not antagonistic."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 notes .(Proposed Final Draft 1981) (citing
Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977)); Merwin v. Rich-
ardson, 52 Conn. 223 (1884); see Sapienza v. New York News, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 676
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Realco Services, Inc. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The fate of
this notion as announced in the case law is unclear under the final version of the Model
Rules. The comment says that 1.7(a) prohibits representation of opponents in litigation, yet
the Rule itself speaks in terms of direct adversity. The comment is a guide to interpreting
the Rule, but must yield to the express language of the Rule.
A cursory reading of the June 1981 version suggests that a lawyer for a trustee who is
accounting judicially (in what is nominally an adversary proceeding) could not also re-
present the beneficiary, even if the account contained no problems. However, a close reading
of 1.7(a) and the notes suggests the opposite. It might be argued that the final version of
Rule 1.7(a) speaks only to direct adversity. In the factual situation given above, the goal of
both sides would be the same-a swift, low-cost termination of the trust. Thus the notes
and cases cited would allow the same lawyer to represent both nominal plaintiff and nomi-
nal defendant.
As an example, assume that Trust Company was accounting to Beneficiary on the wind-
up of a trust for his benefit and that Lawyer was the attorney for both Trust Company and
for the Beneficiary family. If the argument above was accepted, Lawyer could opine to Ben-
eficiary that the trust was properly administered and that there was no reason to hire an-
other lawyer to review the account or contest the settlement of the account. And Lawyer
could go on to represent both parties in court in the judicial settlement.
Presumably, a lawyer would agree to such a dual representation only where she had a
longstanding relationship with the trust beneficiary. Should true adversity develop, with-
drawal from both sides would be required in order to avoid the risks of discipline and
malpractice.
It is interesting to consider whether Lawyer is entitled to bill Beneficiary for such an
opinion. Many lawyers would undoubtedly forego a bill on the theory that the trustee's legal
fee was compensation enough. A more fee-oriented lawyer, however, might justify a modest
additional charge to Beneficiary, primarily for the additional time taken to confer with
Beneficiary.
148. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983).
149. See, e.g., In re Catherwood's Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961).
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performance. A rule of conduct that allows one lawyer to represent
multiple beneficiaries under certain circumstances in a litigated
trust termination is wise. Such litigation is often over-lawyered,
with each lawyer collecting a separate fee.
Also within the scope of Rule 1.7 is the axiom, descended from
the former Canons, that a lawyer may not ordinarily proceed
against a client in one matter whom she represents in a different
matter. 5 0 This can be changed, however, by client consent. Thus,
in the ordinary situation, a lawyer who is outside general counsel
to the trust department of a bank may not represent a disgruntled
trust beneficiary suing the bank as trustee.
There is, however, a more intriguing question for the trusts
and estates specialist who is not general counsel to a bank. May a
lawyer who is attorney for the bank that is trustee of the Jones
trust sue the same bank in its capacity as trustee of the Smith
trust? Before answering, a short description of how banks hire law-
yers is in order. A bank trust department, or the bank as a corpo-
rate entity, has general counsel and perhaps internal house counsel
as well. The general counsel advises the bank on major questions
of policy, renders opinions on questions of fiduciary conduct in-
volving a large number of estates and trusts, and provides will and
trust forms. Payment for these services ordinarily comes from the
bank's general funds. The general counsel is in many senses "the
bank's lawyer."
A completely different situation exists when the bank acts as
the fiduciary of a particular estate or trust, e.g., the Jones trust.
Then the bank ordinarily hires as its lawyer the drafter of the in-
strument-the Jones family lawyer.15 ' This custom guarantees
families that their lawyer will represent family estates and trusts,
and it also encourages lawyers to name banks as fiduciaries.
52
Now it is appropriate to ask the question again. May a lawyer
who is representing the bank as trustee of the Jones trust sue the
same bank as trustee of the Smith trust? The short answer is, "No
150. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983).
151. See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1387.
152. See Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, supra note 51. Indeed, encourag-
ing a client to name a bank as a fiduciary is the closest a lawyer can come to guaranteeing
herself the fiduciary's representation. See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note
4, at 1387. A direction in an instrument to retain the drafter is not binding, however, and in
some circumstances is improper. See State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733
(1972). See generally Comment, Considerations of Professional Responsibility in Probate
Matters, 51 NEB. L. REv. 456 (1972).
[Vol. 38:1
TRUST TERMINATIONS
and yes." Under Rule 1.7 the tentative conclusion is "no. '153 This
negative can change, however, if the bank consents after consulta-
tion. The bank's consent is unlikely to be forthcoming, however.
Assuming that banks usually will not consent, Rule 1.7 effec-
tively denies beneficiaries access to virtually every member of the
trusts and estates specialty bar in a given area, because most, if
not all, such lawyers are likely to be representing the bank in some
153. There is substantial concern that when a lawyer represents a client who is bringing
suit against another client there will be a loss of confidence on the part of the second client
and a risk of disloyalty on the part of the lawyer. Even though the two representations may
be entirely unrelated, the courts have not generally blessed lawyers who represent persons
who are suing another current client. In Cinema 5 v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir.
1976), however, the court declined to establish a rule that would require disqualification of a
lawyer if he sued an existing client in an unrelated case. The court stated that at the very
least the lawyer must show there is no actual or apparent conflict of loyalties. In IBM v.
Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978), plaintiff's law firm had represented him from 1965 to
1969 and also in the present action against IBM beginning in 1972. A member of plaintiff's
law firm also had represented IBM in an unrelated labor matter from 1970 to 1976. IBM
moved for plaintiff's law firm's disqualification, which the court granted. The court implied
that, if there had been disclosure and consent by the clients, it would have allowed dual
representation. See Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profes-
sion, supra note 24, at 1307.
State courts seem stricter in dealing with the question. In Grievance Comm. of the Bar
v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 203 A.2d 82 (1964), a law firm was retained by the trustee in a
debt collection action. During the course of that representation, the firm was retained by
another client in an action against the trustee for assault and battery. The court disqualified
the law firm and vigorously stated that the maintenance of public confidence in the bar
requires an attorney to decline employment adverse to his client even though the nature of
such employment is wholly unrelated to that of his existing representation.
The Supreme Court of Utah held that an attorney acted improperly by first agreeing to
defend B in a civil suit brought by H and then agreeing to defend H in an unrelated crimi-
nal action. See In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978).
Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra note 24,
at 1298-1303, discusses the risks that both clients face if they are represented by the same
lawyer. For example, it finds the risk that Smith, a beneficiary, faces is greater than that
faced by the bank-trustee, because Lawyer's representation of Bank as trustee of the Jones
trust is unrelated to Smith, but Lawyer's representation of Smith is directly related to
Bank. Therefore, the note concludes, Lawyer may defend Smith less vigorously in order to
maintain her relationship with Bank. As valid as this analysis may be in other situations, it
seems irrelevant in the factual situation given in the text. A bank is unlikely to hire a lawyer
in the normal course except when she has brought in her own clients as bank customers.
Indeed, the concern that the lawyer might deprive the bank of future business might induce
the bank to consent to the representation.
Of course, all of this changes when Lawyer's representation of Bank as fiduciary of the
Jones trust ends. Then, Model Rule 1.9, discussed in the text accompanying note 179, infra,
does not interfere because there is no meaningful relationship between the causes of action.
Lawyer runs the risk, however, of losing the opportunity to represent Bank in matters aris-
ing later in which she has drafted the will or trust, because she would then be acting as
advocate against Bank, and both Bank and Smith could veto the representation. This would
harm a lawyer with a significant estates practice, because trusts and estates lawyers do not
get rich suing banks.
1983]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
capacity. This result is unfortunate. While many lawyers are com-
petent to represent a beneficiary adequately, matters of fiduciary
administration are often so arcane that a specialist is particularly
useful.1 564
Economics may make this result more probable than do the
Model Rules. A trust lawyer may be unwilling to go against a bank
because the suit might later interfere with her retention as lawyer
for the bank when instruments she has drafted become effective.
Trusts lawyers do not earn their livings suing banks. The question
raised by the hypothetical situation and the answer to that ques-
tion illustrate a belief long held by the author: rules of ethical con-
duct often provide the lawyer with an excuse to reject a client
whose cause of action is unattractive (in this case, economically) to
the lawyer. 156
It is unfortunate that the effect of a basically sensible rule,
when combined with the reality of the specialty practice, is to deny
trust beneficiaries access to the lawyers best suited to their cases.
Of course, there are always out-of-town lawyers, nonspecialist liti-
gators who can master any case, estates lawyers who do not work
closely with banks, and, in larger cities, lawyers who specialize in
probate litigation. So, let us not weep too long.
A different type of problem arises when the lawyer both repre-
sents the bank that is trustee and acts as family lawyer for the
beneficiaries of the same trust. There is a formal attorney-client
relationship between the lawyer and the bank. Often, there will
also be an attorney-client relationship between the lawyer and the
family members who are beneficiaries.' 66 That relationship may be
de facto or de jure. The relationship is de jure if all parties agree
that the lawyer represents the beneficiaries in the matter of the
trust termination. The relationship is de facto if there is no such
agreement, but there are facts and circumstances that justify the
beneficiaries' conclusion that the lawyer represents them in the
matter of the trust termination. 57 This conclusion might rest on
the lawyer's conduct towards the beneficiaries or on prior relations
between the lawyer and the beneficiaries. 8 The beneficiaries often
are unaware that the attorney's representation of the trustee may
154. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983).
155. See Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HAMY. L.
REv. 702, 704 (1977).
156. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmMLIY OF THE LAwYER, supra note 1, at 115.
157. See id.
158. See MODEL RuS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 comment (1983).
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conflict with her duty to them.
Where one lawyer represents two clients, there is always a po-
tential that she will find herself representing conflicting interests.
The lawyer might dismiss Rule 1.7 as inapplicable, asserting that
there is not direct adversity or material limitation, and ignore the
issue of conflicts. That would be unwise. She might conclude that
Rule 1.7, though currently inapplicable, might become applicable
due to a potential conflict of interest. She might then explain the
potential for conflict to the beneficiaries. The more sophisticated
trustee will already be well aware of the problem. Then the lawyer
might request the consent of both trustee and beneficiaries to her
continuing in her dual role. In current practice, however, many
lawyers will continue both representations without informing the
beneficiaries of the potential problem. "
As long as the lawyer recognizes that a conflict may develop in
the future, she should not be obliged, on pain of discipline, to ex-
plain the potential problem to the clients in advance. All com-
mercial fiduciaries are aware of the potential for conflicts of inter-
est and are well-equipped to protect themselves. If things run
smoothly, the lawyer should be able to allow the de facto or de jure
relationship with the beneficiaries to exist until such time as it
runs afoul of Rule 1.7. If the potential conflict ripens into an actual
one, the lawyer must perform a new Rule 1.7 analysis and may
have to withdraw or seek to mediate. These matters are discussed
in further detail later in this article.'60
These problems have existed in the trusts and estates practice
for many years. 6' The comment to Rule 1.7 recognizes this in the
context of estate administration. It states:
Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and es-
tate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare
wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and,
depending on the circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise.
In estate administration the identity of the client may be un-
clear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view,
the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the
estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should
make clear the relationship to the parties involved. 6'
Many of the conflict questions that arise in the estate adminis-
159. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 115.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 169-71.
161. See, e.g., Corneel, supra note 24.
162. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983).
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tration are analogous to those that arise in trust terminations, as
discussed in this article. For purposes of this article, the author
takes what he believes to be the traditional view that the fiduciary,
not the probate or trust estate as an entity, is the client.' In this
setting conflicts may arise under either paragraph (a) or paragraph
(b) of Rule 1.7.
64
1.7(a) and 1.7(b) do not always coincide neatly with the reali-
ties of trust terminations. As a general rule, more acrimonious dis-
putes are settled by litigation, and less acrimonious disputes are
settled by informal negotiation. This traditional view is reflected in
Rule 1.7 and the comment that follows.165 The comment suggests
that one lawyer can never represent both plaintiff and defendant
in an action.'"1 It would seem, therefore, that all judicial account-
ings fall within the Rule 1.7(a) definition of direct adversity simply
because they involve a plaintiff and a defendant.
67
In the area of trust terminations, however, it is not the case
that only acrimonious disputes are settled judicially. The decision
to litigate is often based on many factors, including the extent of
the dispute, local rule or custom, and the presence of minor or un-
born beneficiaries. On the other hand, an informal trust accounting
normally signifies that the trust termination is undisputed, but
this is not always the case.16' The structure of Rule 1.7 does not
always fit this reality of trust terminations. As a result, the ques-
tion arises whether or not, in a judicial trust termination where the
adversity is purely formal, one lawyer may represent both the trus-
tee and the beneficiary. The parties are then only technically
plaintiff and defendant. Is there a rigid prohibition against one
lawyer's representing, even in a friendly judicial trust termination,
both the nominal plaintiff and the nominal defendant? Are they,
by definition, so directly adverse that it is always against public
policy for one lawyer to represent both?
163. See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1382. See generally
NATIONAL FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS PROJEcT, UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES AND MODEL ACCOUNT FORMATS (1980). A substantially similar version of the Uni-
form Principles can be found in Proposed Uniform Fiduciary Accounting Principles and
Model Account Formats, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 941 (1978).
164. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 1.7 set different standards to be applied to deter-
mine if a conflict exists.
165. See Aronson, supra note 14, at 810-11.
166. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983).
167. Rule 1.7(a) prohibits representation of opposing parties in litigation. Simultaneous
representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or
co-defendants, is governed by Rule 1.7(b).
168. See Westfall, supra note 35.
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The short and simple answer appears to be that the same law-
yer may never represent both trustee and beneficiary in a judicial
accounting. One could argue that in appropriate circumstances
there is no direct adversity, that the nominal plaintiff-defendant
status is without substance, and that 1.7(a) and 1.7(b) are both
irrelevant. It could also be argued that the 1.7(a) prohibition is ini-
tially applicable, but that the curative provisions of that section
are available to allow the dual representation. The first person to
make these arguments may face significant opposition from those
who find the notion that one lawyer can adequately represent
plaintiff and defendant inconceivable.
Whether one lawyer may represent both trustee and benefi-
ciary in informal settlements is a function of the degree of differ-
ence between their interests. 69 There may be direct adversity of
such intensity that 1.7(a) alone is operative, and the lawyer is then
unable reasonably to accept the representation. The fact that the
settlement of the trust is informal may not be determinative of the
conflict of interest analysis.
In those informal accountings where adversity is less intense,
the lawyer may reasonably believe that the representation is ap-
propriate, and the clients could consent after consultation. That is,
1.7(a) would still govern, but its curative provisions would permit
the dual representation. In an informal settlement where the rep-
resentation of one client may be only "materially limited" by the
representation of the other client, 1.7(b) would govern. In that
case, it might not be reasonable for the lawyer to believe that dual
representation was appropriate, and the need for two lawyers
would be indicated. If the reasonable belief standard is met, how-
ever, then the lawyer could represent both clients after
consultation.
Common sense suggests that no lawyer would undertake de
jure represention of both trustee and beneficiary in any judicial
settlement of an account, irrespective of cordial relations between
them. Nor would she represent both trustee and beneficiary in a
settlement where there would be a material limitation on her abil-
ity to represent one of the clients. There is little reason in this area
of the law for a lawyer to agree to function in a "materially lim-
ited" fashion, even if consent is available. 17 0 The risks to lawyer
169. See Appendix A.
170. It is a reasonable assumption that in the wind-up of a trust there is potential for
both small and large conflicts of interest between the parties to arise. The best way to ana-
lyze a small conflict of interest between a fiduciary and a beneficiary is to assume that we
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and clients outweigh any potential benefits of continued
representation. 
1 7 1
Rule 1.9. In order to bridge the gap between Rule 1.7 and Rule
1.9, one should note Rule 1.16, which deals with attorney with-
drawal, that is, declining or terminating representation. Rule 1.16,
as relevant to this discussion, requires an attorney to withdraw if
the representation results in violation of another Model Rule.1
71
For present purposes, when the conflict of interest exceptions to
Rule 1.7 can no longer be satisfied, the lawyer must withdraw
under Rule 1.16.178
The attorney may choose at the outset to withdraw from rep-
are dealing with an estate rather than a trust. The executor of an estate is entitled to a fee.
A reasonable fee might be three percent of the estate. In a million dollar estate this would
be $30,000. An estate of that size could easily be open for three years. The question is, when
does the executor get paid? The historic staring point for answering the question is that the
executor gets paid at the termination of the estate. This means that the $30,000 stays in the
estate for three years earning income for the estate's beneficiaries. Assuming a return of ten
percent, there is a substantial pecuniary conflict to the extent that the executor is entitled
to be paid earlier in the administration of the estate. When the estate opens, the conflict is
only potential and clearly should not interfere in any way with the relationship between the
lawyer and the fiduciary on the one hand and the benficiaries on the other hand. If the
fiduciary seeks early compensation, which happens with increasing frequency, then a conflict
of interest exists to the extent that the availability of early payment lies in the discretion of
the judge. At some point, the discretion will be exercised by reference to custom or court
rule, and the conflict will disappear.
A lawyer, asked by a fiduciary to petition for early payment of the fee, clearly seems to
have the duty to prepare the papers. Thereafter, a conflict of interest arises. Can the lawyer
point out the potential imposition to the beneficiary? Can she encourage the beneficiary to
resist the request? Can she warn the beneficiary of the conflict, such as it is, and suggest
that the beneficiary consult another lawyer?
In answering these questions, the starting point has to be that the matter is not impor-
tant enough to prevent the lawyer from functioning in a normal manner. Nor is it important
enough to justify the retention of separate counsel. Indeed, the best resolution of the matter
may lie in intermediation, which is discussed in the text accompanying notes 187 to 236,
infra.
171. Lawyers often represent multiple trustees of the same trust. This is another ex-
ample of potential multi-client conflicts. They arise in a more straightforward fashion, be-
cause there is no doubt that multiple attorney-client relationships exist. Such multiple rep-
resentations are common and usually satisfactory. The interests of the trustees, however,
can diverge. For example, if there has been some form of investment mismanagement that is
attributable solely to the corporate fiduciary, then an individual family member acting as a
co-fiduciary would likely need independent counsel. Once these potential conflicts become
actual, the attorney must refer to Model Rule 1.7.
At that point, the bank is likely to turn to its general counsel for representation, and
the beneficiaries to a third lawyer. The family lawyer who has done much of the day-to-day
representation of the fiduciaries presumably would be entitled to substantial compensation
for that work, and indeed, probably would participate in the uncontested aspects of the
wind-up of the trust.
172. See MoaL RULES Op PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1983).
173. Id. Rule 1.16(a)(1).
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resenting both parties, and the matter is then closed.17 4 If the at-
torney seeks to continue representing one of the clients, then a fur-
ther analysis must be made. The client from whose representation
she has withdrawn becomes a former client. The lawyer must then
consider Rule 1.9, which governs conflicts of interest between pre-
sent and former clients. In most cases, Rule 1.9 forbids the contin-
ued representation unless the former client consents after
consultation.
Rule 1.9 provides,
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter
shall not thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which that person's interests are materially ad-
verse to the interests of the former client unless the former cli-
ent consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would per-
mit with respect to a client or when the information has become
generally known.
Rule 1.9 is straightforward. A lawyer may not represent an interest
materially adverse to that of a former client if the representation
arises out of the same or a substantially related matter. Addition-
ally, the lawyer is prohibited from using information relevant to
the prior representation in a manner adverse to the former client.
Both prohibitions may be waived by the former client's informed
consent. The Rule serves to preserve loyalty and avoid misuse of
confidential information.1
75
Problems under Rule 1.9 commonly arise in two circumstances
in the trusts practice. The first exists where an attorney has multi-
ple clients involved with the same trust, and a conflict not within
an exception to Rule 1.7 arises between them. Rule 1.16 requires
that she no longer represent both parties; Rule 1.9 addresses the
question whether or not she can continue to represent either.
171
The second circumstance creating problems under Rule 1.9 arises
where the lawyer has represented a commercial fiduciary in mat-
ters involving a number of unrelated trusts and is now asked (per-
haps as a guardian ad litem) to oppose the bank in unrelated
174. See id. Rule 1.16.
175. See id. Rule 1.9 comment.
176. See generally Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Pro-
fession, supra note 24.
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litigation.1 7
Rule 1.9 is of interest in trust terminations primarily in the
first type of situation, that is, when a lawyer has represented mul-
tiple parties within the guidelines of Rule 1.7,17' and there subse-
quently is discord. At that point, under Rule 1.9 the lawyer may
not continue to represent any of the parties. The disqualification
rule is, however, for the client's protection and so may be waived
after consultation.17 9 Waiver may be obtained when there is open
conflict or when the conflict is still merely potential. 80 The classic
conflicts of this first sort are between fiduciary and beneficiary, be-
tween multiple fiduciaries of the same trust, or between benefi-
ciaries with different property interests in the same trust. These
situations are discussed in more detail below.' 1
The second problem area under Rule 1.9 involves the special-
ist who represents a commercial fiduciary on a repeated basis in
matters involving unrelated trusts, but who does not currently re-
present the fiduciary, and who would now oppose the fiduciary.
This is a "pure" Rule 1.9 situation. That is, the bank is truly a
former client, not a former client by virtue of a Rule 1.16 with-
drawal. In that situation the lawyer may take a legal position con-
trary to that taken by the bank. 8 She could not, however, attack
the bank for questionable policies that she discovered during the
previous representations. 88
In either the withdrawal or the former-representation situa-
tion, the fiduciary could, but would be unlikely to, waive the pro-
tection of the Rule. 8 4 Where the attorney's relationship with the
bank is of long duration, and her relationship with the benefi-
ciaries is solely with respect to the trust, the beneficiaries might be
177. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 115-32.
178. The representation might also take place as an intermediary under Rule 2.2.
179. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comment (1983).
180. The stark formality of a waiver at the beginning of a representation of persons
with potentially conflicting interests, presumably in writing, will certainly intrude on the
gentility of the estates practice. It would be most intrusive if obtained from beneficiaries
after a testator's death. For a discussion, in another estate administration context, of early
presentation of a waiver of procedural rights, see Kahn & Gallo, supra note 12.
181. See infra text accompanying notes 187-236.
182. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comment (1983).
183. For a discussion of the type of questionable policy discussed in the text, see
Levmore, Bank Trust Departments and "Float" Revenue: Finding the Proper Procedures,
98 BANKING L.J. 817 (1981). See also E. HERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: COMMERCIAL BANK
TRUST DEPARTMENTS (1975).
184. The result might be different if the lawyer was a major source of business for the
bank. Then the bank might waive the protection of the rule in order to please the lawyer as
a source of business.
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more likely to waive their protection, if any, under Rule 1.9.185
It is easy to see why a lawyer who represents banks on a regu-
lar basis might be reluctant to sue a bank on behalf of a disgrun-
tled beneficiary. It is wise to avoid the snarls of conflict of interest
rules, and changing sides, even though it often is not disloyal,
smacks of disloyalty. Also, it is unwise to alienate one's best poten-
tial clients. The situation is suggestive of the separation of torts
lawyers into a plaintiffs bar and an insurance defense bar."'6
Rule 2.2. Model Rule 2.2 deals with the lawyer's role as inter-
mediary. It deserves our consideration because it deals with repre-
sentation of multiple clients and conflicting interests, requiring yet
another conflicts of interest analysis by the trustee's lawyer. Rule
2.2 provides,
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concern-
ing the implications of the common representation, in-
cluding the advantages and risks involved, and the ef-
185. The beneficiaries might well assume that the lawyer would inevitably prefer the
bank's point of view. See Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal
Profession, supra note 24, at 1296-306.
186. The comment to Rule 1.9, states that "a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of
problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a
wholly distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a
position adverse to the prior client." The application of this rule to the trust termination
situation is, however, less simple than the rule might make it appear. This is so because a
curious situation arises when a bank hires the "family" lawyer to represent it in its dealings
with the beneficiaries of a family trust. The situation involves the reversal of several "nor-
mal" role patterns.
In one role reversal, the client, i.e., the bank, is often more sophisticated than the law-
yer. The bank routinely deals with trusts and legal questions of fiduciary responsibility. The
lawyer, retained solely because of her association with the family, may be without special
competence in the trust area. The bank officer will feel neither the need nor the inclination
to disclose any secrets to the lawyer. The relationship is not one of intimate confidence and
reliance by the client.
The lawyer, who was hired because of past representation of the family, no longer rep-
resents them. Precisely because of that prior representation, she now represents an interest
at least potentially adverse to theirs. If there is a falling out between fiduciary and benefi-
ciaries, it seems almost inevitable that the lawyer would either represent only the fiduciary
or withdraw. This is so because the fiduciary is on the defensive and will seek to defend acts
about which the lawyer is likely to have special knowledge. No sensible fiduciary would
agree to a lawyer crossover in this situation, and a system allowing that would condone
disloyalty. Withdrawal and payment for services rendered up to that point seems inevitable.
The long-term association with family interests forecloses the lawyer's continuing to re-
present the fiduciary. Having been privy to the confidences of the fiduciary forecloses the
lawyer's continuing to represent the family.
When the lawyer has a previous working relationship with the fiduciary and is distant
from the beneficiaries, her continuing allegiance to the fiduciary creates fewer problems.
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fect on the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each
client's consent to the common representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the mat-
ter can be resolved on terms compatible with the cli-
ents' best interests, that each client will be able to
make adequately informed decisions in the matter and
that there is little risk of material prejudice to the in-
terests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolu-
tion is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the com-
mon representation can be undertaken impartially and
without improper effect on other responsibilities the
lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult
with each client concerning the decisions to be made and the
considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can
make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the
clients so requests, or if any of the conditions stated in para-
graph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer
shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter
that was the subject of the intermediation.
The Rule allows a lawyer, under certain conditions, to represent
multiple clients with conflicting interests. Within its somewhat re-
strictive framework, Rule 2.2 is a meaningful expansion of the cur-
rent limitations on the ability of one lawyer to represent multiple
clients with conflicting interests in the same matter.
Under the CPR, the ethical lawyer who represents clients with
conflicting interests has to fit one of several limited categories. For
the most part, these have already been discussed. 8 7 The only cate-
gory not discussed is the very limited one of arbitrator-mediator
set out in EC 5-20.188 EC 5-20 allows a lawyer to arbitrate or medi-
ate client differences under such limited circumstances that it has
had virtually no meaning in the trusts and estates practice. 89
Rule 2.2 apparently would allow a lawyer to represent clients
187. See supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
188. EC 5-20 reads in its entirety,
A lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial arbitrator or mediator in matters
which involve present or former clients. He may serve in either capacity if he
first discloses such present or former relationships. After a lawyer has under-
taken to act as an impartial arbitrator or mediator, he should not thereafter
represent in the dispute any of the parties involved.
189. See Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, supra note 124, at 683.
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with conflicting interests in very limited new circumstances. Rule
2.2 clearly allows a lawyer to act in nonlitigation situations as an
intermediary between clients with potentially conflicting interests.
It arguably also allows a lawyer to act as intermediary between cli-
ents with actually conflicting interests in noncontentious and non-
antagonistic, nonlitigation situations. Rule 2.2(a)(3) seems to allow
the lawyer to act as intermediary when she believes it is appropri-
ate and will not have an adverse effect; language in the comment
also indicates that this interpretation is correct. The comment ap-
proves "common representation where the clients' interest are sub-
stantially though not entirely compatible."'
' e
It seems to the author that Rule 2.2 and its comment do not
directly and concretely approve common representation of conflict-
ing interests in mediation. The Rule and comment do, however, lay
the base for future approval of such representations. Most broadly
construed, the Rule does approve such representations under ap-
propriate circumstances-those that are noncontentious and hold a
substantial promise of successful conclusion."' To understand
Rule 2.2, it is helpful to compare the lawyer with the fiduciary.
The lawyer who acts as an intermediary is much like the fiduciary
who must make decisions in an impartial manner without favoring
either income or principal beneficiaries.
92
Under Rule 2.2, before a lawyer may act as an intermediary,
i.e., before she may represent potentially or actually conflicting in-
terests with the goal of harmonizing them, several threshold re-
quirements must be met: (1) consultation with and consent by the
client; (2) reasonable belief by the lawyer that the clients' best in-
terest will be served, that each client will be able to make informed
decisions as the matter progresses, and that there is little risk to
the clients in the arrangement if a common goal cannot be reached;
and (3) reasonable belief by the lawyer that she can act impartially
190. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2(a)(3) comment (1983) (emphasis
added). "The general rule prohibiting representation of clients with conflicting interests by
a single attorney has never been so broadly stated as to preclude an attorney from ever
accepting employment from two different persons merely because of a conflict of interest."
Kreis v. Block, 75 A.2d 523, 524 (D.C. 1950), quoted in MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 2.2 notes, at 115 (Proposed Final Draft 1981). "In each of these instances
there is a possibility of conflict, if not actual conflict, in the interests of the persons repre-
sented, but it cannot be said as a matter of law that an attorney is prohibited from acting
for both parties in such cases with the knowledge and consent of both." Lessing v. Gibbons,
6 Cal. App. 2d 598, 606, 45 P.2d 258, 261 (1935) (emphasis added), quoted in MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 notes, at 115 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
191. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 & comment (1983).
192. See id. Rule 2.2(a)(3).
1983]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
and without affecting her other responsibilities to the clients. 93
It is crucial to the intermediation process that the client be
able to make adequately informed decisions throughout the pro-
cess.1 94 The elimination of additional lawyers places more responsi-
bility on the clients. Therefore, Rule 2.2 wisely requires the lawyer
to "consult with each client concerning the decisions to be made
and the considerations relevant in making them."' 95 Without such
a requirement intermediation cannot work. The Rule also provides
for mandatory withdrawal if any of the clients request it, or if the
threshold conditions for intermediation cease to exist.196
After the lawyer has withdrawn from the role of intermediary,
she may not represent any of the clients "in the matter that was
the subject matter of the intermediation.' 19 7 Although Rule 2.2
makes no explicit statement on the question, one assumes that the
withdrawal obligations of Rule 1.16 apply, though Rule 2.2 pro-
vides a more demanding withdrawal standard than Rule 1.16, and
a former-client analysis under Rule 1.9 must still be made. There-
fore, the lawyer will have to withdraw completely in most cases
unless she can obtain the former client's consent.
There seem to be several policies behind this modification of
the lawyer's adversarial role: (1) promoting efficiency by reducing
cost and complexity; 98 (2) improving access to legal representation
by reducing costs (even if the representation is less than fully ad-
versarial and is thus in some sense impaired); 99 (3) improving the
public image of the bar20 0 by promoting a result that many clients
seem to want; and (4) keeping up with changes within the profes-
sion, which seem to be ahead of the professional responsibility ap-
paratus on this question.2 ' Intermediation is a useful and whole-
some step forward. It is the author's belief, however, as the
following analysis will show, that the concept has somewhat lim-
193. See id. Rule 2.2 & comment.
194. Similarly, information is the sine qua non of the trust accounting. See J. RITCHIE,
N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1382-83.
195. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2(b) (1983).
196. Id. Rule 2.2(c).
197. Id.
198. The desire for efficiency in the world of estate administration is discussed in many
places. For an example, see Martin, Justice and Efficiency Under a Model of Estate Settle-
ment, 66 VA. L. REv. 727 (1980).
199. See Legal Ethics Forum, Representation of Multiple Clients, 62 A.B.A. J. 648
(1976).
200. The public image of the bar is a factor in legal ethics. See MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1981).
201. See Legal Ethics Forum, supra note 199.
[Vol. 38:1
TRUST TERMINATIONS
ited utility in the area of trust terminations.
The specifics of intermediation are quite interesting. Most of
the examples given in the comment to Rule 2.2 involve represent-
ing clients with different claims to the same assets, e.g., creators of
a new business, creditors of a troubled business, takers of an es-
tate, or parties to a divorce.20 2 To determine the permissibility of
intermediation in a given situation, one must examine in context
the various threshold requirements of Rule 2.2. The Rule requires
that the lawyer explain to each client "the implications of the com-
mon representation, including the advantages and risks
involved.
20 3
It is useful at this point to look at the role of the lawyer in the
termination of a trust. During the time the trust has been in exis-
tence, the lawyer has probably been counsel of record to the trus-
tee and may have rendered advice on questions of fiduciary's ad-
ministration or distribution. She is most likely to have rendered
advice if the trustee has encountered problems, or if there has been
some reason to account or make a partial payment of principal.
At the termination of the trust, the trustee must see to the
preparation of a formal accounting and either a petition or a "re-
ceipt and release."20 ' Ordinarily, this is lawyer's work.2 5 If the ac-
count shows questionable conduct on the part of the trustee, then
the trustee will surely need a lawyer to help avoid or minimize his
liability to the beneficiaries.2 Moreover, the language of the in-
strument or the circumstances existing at termination may require
a judicial proceeding to determine the meaning or application of
the trust's terms.20 Again, this is lawyer's work. Until the lawyer
knows what the fiduciary has done, which may well not be until
after the account has been prepared, the lawyer cannot know the
advantages and risks that might be involved in mediation. It there-
fore appears that, through the point of preparing the account, the
lawyer must work for the trustee alone, reserving judgment as to
whether she can also represent the beneficiaries. If there is a prob-
lem in the fiduciary's administration, she must represent only the
202. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 comment (1983).
203. Id. Rule 2.2(a)(1).
204. A receipt and release is a document showing the receipt of all funds by the benefi-
ciary and a release of the fiduciary from further liability. See Westfall, supra note 35. See
generally A. LORING, supra note 33, § 116.
205. See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1382-86.
206. See id. at 1384. See generally Limiting Future Actions After Trust Account Ap-
proval, supra note 65, at 503.
207. G. BOGERT & D. OAKS, supra note 39, at 567-68.
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trustee. If the account does not present any problems, then she
may also work as an intermediary between the fiduciary and the
beneficiary.20
The second requirement of Rule 2.2(a)(2) is that the lawyer
hold a reasonable belief "that the matter can be resolved on terms
compatible with [all] the clients' best interests. ' 20 9 Often the law-
yer has no basis for any belief on this point until the account has
been prepared and proves to be free of any question of breach of
duty by the trustee. Only then is mediation appropriate, because
there are no problems. At that point efficiency is not served by the
beneficiaries' having a lawyer. They do not need one and often do
not hire one. 10
A problematic administration might seem initially to be in-
termediable. It is not at all clear, however, that mediation will
work when the beneficiary has a complaint about the trustee's con-
duct, especially where the fiduciary is an institution. Banks rarely
admit liability or settle claims involving their own liability. This is
the case because courts are reluctant to punish fiduciaries who act,
however unsuccessfully, in good faith. 211  Also, commercial
fiduciaries must resist every attempt at surcharge to avoid con-
stant litigation by beneficiaries complaining about investment
performance.
When something is amiss, a beneficiary ordinarily may obtain
redress only by prosecuting a successful case against the fiduciary.
In that case, the beneficiary must retain his own counsel. The law-
yer for the trustee will not be able to settle the dispute by
intermediation. a
A third requirement under Rule 2.2(a)(2) is that a lawyer who
wants to act as an intermediary must reasonably believe "that each
client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the
matter. 2 1 2 This requirement, too, may interfere with the use of
intermediation in trust terminations. It is not at all clear that in
208. See generally Fleming, supra note 72, 71.600.
209. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2(a)(2) (1983).
210. That beneficiaries often do not retain lawyers is noted in City Bar Ethics Opinion,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 22, 1982, at 3, col. 1. Since beneficiaries rarely hire their own lawyers, since
there is no sharing of the fee, and since the trustee pays the fee out of the trust assets before
distributing the net to the beneficiaries, it seems that the primary purpose of intermediation
is to provide a way for the fastidious lawyer to provide comfort and advice to the benefi-
ciaries without running afoul of a disciplinary stricture against representing inharmonious
interests.
211. See In re Brownell, 112 Misc. 2d 719, 447 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Delaware County Ct.
1981).
212. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2(a)(2) (1983).
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any fiduciary accounting matter the typical beneficiary is able to
make an "adequately informed decision." An accounting is far too
complex for the average beneficiary to understand. " '
The cases take the position that an account constitutes full
disclosure, but the truth is that, while fiduciary accounts may pro-
vide full disclosure, they do not provide adequate understandable
information absent extensive explanation by a knowledgeable per-
son. " ' Thus the only way to cross this threshold of Rule 2.2(a)(2)
is for the lawyer or the accounting fiduciary to provide extensive
interpretation of the account. They may be unwilling to do this for
reasons of time or, as discussed immediately below, out of a desire
to protect their own interests.
There is yet another requirement of Rule 2.2 that may make it
inapplicable to trust terminations. Rule 2.2(a)(2) requires that
there be "little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of
the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful." Due to
the complexity of fiduciary accountings, many beneficiaries fail to
recognize any trustee shortcomings. In a formal adversary proceed-
ing, neither the lawyer who represents the trustee nor the trustee
has an obligation to explain the account to the beneficiary.210 If
they do offer an explanation, it is out of a sense of decency or as a
matter of business judgment. Often, to explain is to invite litiga-
tion. Therefore, intermediation always poses a risk for the trustee
when there is cause for beneficiary complaint, because intermedia-
tion increases the beneficiaries' knowledge about their rights. Most
fiduciaries would agree to intermediation only where their adminis-
tration has been exemplary. Again, efficiency 1 6 is not served by
intermediation, because, when the administration has been satis-
factory, the beneficiaries are unlikely to hire a second lawyer7
213. See generally NATIONAL FmucRy ACCOUNTING STANDARDS PRoJEcr, supra note
163. A fiduciary who wishes to be released from all liability to his or her beneficiaries must
obtain a release from the beneficiaries based on full disclosure. Full disclosure consists of
providing a detailed fiduciary account that shows every financial transaction during the pe-
riod covered by the account. Such accounts are very long, complicated documents that few
lawyers, much less nonlawyers, can understand. See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND,
supra note 4, at 1382-86.
214. See generally Limiting Future Actions After Trust Account Approval, supra note
65.
215. See Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful
Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 669 (1981). See generally Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation
to be Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C.L. Rav. 181 (1981).
216. See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 32.
217. Presumably the preceding discussion has made many readers uncomfortable: a
system based on full disclosure that discloses very little, a suggestion that "wise" fiduciaries
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Rule 2.2(a)(3) further requires that the lawyer reasonably be-
lieve "that the common representation can be undertaken impar-
tially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the law-
yer has to any of the clients." This threshold requirement of
impartiality is most important. The lawyer must believe that she
can harmonize what must be a minimal number of conflicts be-
tween clients to whom she owes a duty of loyalty.2 18 If harmony
cannot be attained, then resolution must occur within an adversary
framework. Impartiality thus becomes crucial-both the reasona-
ble initial belief that the lawyer can be impartial and the continu-
ing requirement of actual impartiality. Without impartiality, inter-
mediation is impossible.2 19
Rule 2.2(b) contains yet another threshold requirement for in-
termediation. It requires the lawyer-intermediary to "consult with
each client concerning the decisions to be made and the considera-
tions relevant in making them, so that each client can make ade-
quately informed decisions." As discussed above, a constant flow of
information to the client is crucial to intermediation.2 2 Intermedi-
ation rests, in large part, on the assumption that the informed and
competent client will protect his or her own interests. This self-
help is necessary because the lawyer-intermediary role is incom-
patible with the lawyer's traditionally single-minded advocacy of
one party's interests.221
will seek to keep beneficiaries in the dark to minimize liability. The author suggests one
solution-understandable fiduciary accounts that provide adequate information to non-
specialists. Some progress is being made towards this goal. See generally NATIONAL FIDUCI-
ARY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS PROJECT, supra note 163; J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND,
supra note 4, at 1382-86.
More complex than the issue of incomprehensible accounts is that of fiduciary-benefi-
ciary adversity. There is an inevitable duality in the relationship. During the administration
of the trust the fiduciary must act solely for the beneficiary. When the fiduciary seeks the
settlement of the account, however, he must act solely for himself. At the point at which the
fiduciary must protect himself, the bencficiary must be warned. Perhaps every fiduciary ac-
count might carry the label, "Warning: the Surgeon General has determined that this ac-
count may be dangerous to your fiscal well being!"
Of course, once it becomes clear that the fiduciary has acted properly and has not im-
posed upon the beneficiaries, things return to normal. All parties have a common goal-the
efficient winding-up of the trust with a minimum expenditure of time and money. See J.
RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1382-86.
218. Cf. Dobris, Equitable Adjustments in Postmortem Income Tax Planning: An Un-
remitting Diet of Warms, 65 IowA L. REV. 103, 107-08 (1979) (discussing duty of
impartiality).
219. As to impartiality, see 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 3, § 183 and 3 id. § 232. See also J.
SHEPARD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES (1981).
220. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
221. If the lawyer is to continue to represent one client, it ordinarily should be the
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The comment to Rule 2.2 deals with fees in intermediation:
A lawyer acts as intermediary under this Rule when the
lawyer represents two or more parties with potentially conflict-
ing interests. A key factor in defining the relationship is whether
the parties share responsibility for the lawyer's fee, but the com-
mon representation may be inferred from other circumstances.
Because confusion can arise as to the lawyer's role where each
party is not separately represented, it is important that the law-
yer make clear the relationship.222
The shared fee structure suggested in the comment is worthy
of note for two reasons: (1) it may make some attorneys more com-
fortable with the nontraditional process of intermediation, and (2)
Rule 2.2 affords the attorney who follows its guidelines a degree of
protection from claims by nonclients.
Many lawyers may be uncomfortable in the intermediary's role
of representing conflicting interests.. The comment's approval of
the lawyer's taking fees from both clients clearly underscores the
propriety of the dual representation. Moreover, the shared fee
structure focuses the attention of all parties on the special nature
of the relationship.
The shared fee also serves as an emblem of intermediation. It
is the best evidence of the lawyer's role as intermediary. Con-
versely, a party who pays nothing to the lawyer may find it difficult
to establish a de facto attorney-client relationship under the
Rule.223 The lawyer is, in all likelihood, protected from a claim that
she owed a duty to a party who paid her no fee. The shared fee
device, however, like many other aspects of Rule 2.2, is incompati-
ble with current practices in the area of trust termination.
Traditionally, the trustee pays the lawyer a fee consisting of a
small percentage of trust principal.2 24 As discussed above, the ben-
eficiaries typically do not retain a lawyer.225 They ordinarily satisfy
themselves with information, if not advice, from the trustee's law-
yer. The trustee's lawyer does not charge the beneficiaries for any
time spent with them. It is understood to be part of the represen-
trustee, because the trustee is more likely to have divulged confidences and secrets to the
lawyer.
222. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 comment, at 64 (1983).
223. See Johnston, Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning-Perilous Times Ahead for
the Practitioner, 67 IowA L. REv. 629, 658 (1982).
224. Ultimately, the fee reduces the amount of property going to the beneficiaries, but
this is not categorized as a payment by the beneficiaries. See generally J. PRICE, CONTEMPO-
RARY ESTATE PLANNING § 1.15 (1982).
225. See supra note 210.
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tation of the trustee.22 Only if the beneficiaries feel a need for in-
dependent counsel do they hire another lawyer, typically on an
hourly basis. 22 7 The beneficiaries pay that hourly fee directly. It is
not a trust expenditure, and it does not operate to reduce the fee
of the trustee's lawyer.
2 28
Should the lawyer for the trustee act as an intermediary, the
traditional fee pattern presumably would change. Paradoxically,
the cost of an uncontested trust settlement might increase in inter-
mediation, because the lawyer may do more work and accept more
responsibility.229 The lawyer might then be entitled to her custom-
ary fee from the fiduciary plus a fee from the beneficiaries. Inter-
mediation, a concept designed to lower costs, may raise costs ab-
sent a restructuring of customary fee arrangements.230 Finally,
even if the fee structure is changed, there is no direct economic
incentive for the trustee to seek intermediation; any savings accrue
to the trust fund and its beneficiaries, not to the trustee.
The comment imposes yet another threshold requirement for
intermediation that may make it unavailable in some trust termi-
nations. It states that "a lawyer cannot undertake common repre-
sentation of clients between whom contentious litigation is immi-
nent. 2 31 In any jurisdiction where fiduciary accounts are settled
judicially, intermediation may therefore often be unavailable be-
cause such a settlement is technically a litigation, and there may
be possible grounds for contention between the parties. 2
The fiduciary who agrees to intermediation runs a significant
risk that the beneficiaries will later claim that the settlement was
not binding because they were not adequately represented by the
intermediary,8 3 or they did not know the nature of the proceed-
ings.23' Once again, the use of intermediation as a tool in trust ter-
226. As to fee practices in the probate area, see generally Martin, supra note 24.
227. See generally J. PRICE, supra note 224, § 1.15.
228. Moreover, in such a case the negotiations may be too contentious for
intermediation.
229. See generally Martin, supra note 24.
230. Such a general restructuring may be inevitable anyway. See generally J. PRICE,
supra note 224, § 1.15.
231. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 comment (1983).
232. See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1382-84. If not conten-
tious, it is tempting to argue that a judicial settlement is often a litigation in form only and
that it is foolish to observe form over substance.
233. See Limiting Future Actions After Trust Account Approval, supra note 65. There
is also the risk of a malpractice suit. See Johnston, supra note 223, at 658.
234. See Limiting Future Actions After Trust Account Approval, supra note 65.
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minations seems ill-advised. 35
Intermediation stands on three legs: impartiality, information
and withdrawal. The primary purpose of Rule 2.2 is to define a
safe harbor for the lawyer as intermediary in order to encourage
intermediation. The Rule requires affirmative conduct by the law-
yer to reach the safe harbor. Intermediation is a very useful con-
cept, but it is apt to prove of little value in the trust termination
setting.2 6
Summary of the MRPC Approach to Conflicts of Interest.
The primary goal of the Model Rules is to preserve the lawyer's
independent judgment and her loyalty to the client. The lawyer
must avoid conflicts between interests that are directly adverse or
that materially interfere with the lawyer's independent profes-
sional judgment. Client consent cures dual representation
problems except where there is an absolute prohibition against the
representation or where a disinterested lawyer would say that the
client should not agree to the dual representation. There can be no
dual representation in contentious litigation.23 7 There can be no
representation of two parties on the same side of litigation when
235. Intermediation is inappropriate for other reasons as well. The lawyer's duty of
confidentiality also operates to bar intermediation except where the fiduciary has done an
acceptable job. The comment makes clear that a lawyer must maintain all client confidences
while acting as intermediary. If the trustee's performance is in any way vulnerable to attack,
then to the extent that that vulnerability is not set out in the account, the duty to maintain
client confidences bars the lawyer from divulging it. To the extent it is apparent from the
account, the duty of loyalty often requires that the lawyer not discuss it.
The comment suggests that the impartiality required for intermediation may be impos-
sible for the lawyer to maintain where she has a long-term relationship with one client and a
short-term relationship with another. In many trust terminations, the attorney has had a
long-term relationship with both the institutional trustee and the beneficiaries. Even if the
longer relationship was with the beneficiaries, both the bank and the lawyer may strongly
desire that the lawyer continue to represent the bank. Again, it seems that intermediation
cannot be used to rationalize the lawyer's position. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 2.2 comment (1983).
236. If intermediation is to be used in trust terminations, then the lawyer's role is cru-
cial. As discussed above, after the account is prepared the lawyer must decide whether the
trustee's conduct is sufficiently proper to justify an uncontested settlement. Only if it is can
she consider suggesting intermediation with its attendant risks to clients and professional
reputation. The attorney may find that these risks are justifiable only for those benefi-
ciaries with whom sle has had a previous professional relationship.
Reliance on impartiality and information parallel the trust model. That is, the trust
beneficiary is protected in large part by the requirements that the fiduciary keep the benefi-
ciary informed, and that the trustee act impartially. So too, the client of the lawyer-interme-
diary is protected by an information and impartiality rule.
237. Under the 1981 version of the Model Rules, a lawyer arguably could represent
both sides in a noncontentious litigation under appropriate circumstances. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 notes, at 55 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
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their positions are incompatible or when there is a possibility of
substantially different settlements. It is proper to represent parties
on the same side of the litigation if their differences are insubstan-
tial. A lawyer may not sue in one matter a client whom she cur-
rently represents in an unrelated matter unless she obtains the
consent of that client. A lawyer may not sue a former client in the
same or a substantially related matter if the present client's inter-
est is materially adverse to the former client's, unless the former
client consents. A lawyer may not use information obtained from a
former client to the disadvantage of the former client without that
person's consent.
A lawyer may act as an intermediary. She may represent per-
sons as an intermediary in nonlitigation situations where their in-
terests are potentially conflicting and perhaps when they are actu-
ally conflicting. Before a lawyer may act as intermediary she must
explain the implications and risks of intermediation to all clients
and obtain their consent. Moreover, the lawyer must hold the rea-
sonable belief that the best interests of all the clients will be
served, that all the clients can make adequately informed decisions
regarding the subject of the intermediation, that there is little risk
to any client if the goal of the intermediation is not reached, and
that the lawyer can act impartially and without effect on her other
responsibilities to the clients. The lawyer-intermediary must with-
draw if any client requests it or if any of the above conditions
cease to exist. After withdrawal, the lawyer may not represent any
party to the intermediation unless such representation of one cli-
ent will be proper as to the intermediation clients no longer
represented.
The Model Rules are derived from and closely related to the
CPR. There appears to the author, however, to have been a slight
shift of focus. The primary concern of the MRPC is the preserva-
tion of independent professional judgment. This idea is derived
from Canon 5 of the CPR. Loyalty to the client and the safeguard-
ing of information, in that order, are only slightly less important.
This seems to indicate a slight movement towards what might be
described as a solicitor's test and away from a barrister's test. That
is, the court lawyer's first concern-loyalty to the client-may be
yielding to the desk lawyer's first concern-preservation of inde-
pendent professional judgment. The concern for the appearance of
propriety seems to have lost its place in the ethics firmament. That
is all to the good.
On balance, the Model Rules are an improvement of the pro-
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fession's conflict of interest standards. They are more realistic and
more useful than the CPR. If a profession is to be self-policing, its
rules must, of course, be sensible and understandable. The Model
Rules meet these criteria.
Dealing With Unrepresented Persons. Another important is-
sue in the ethics of trust terminations involves the lawyer's deal-
ings with unrepresented persons. This situation raises issues of
overreaching 28 and overzealous representation.2 3 9 Moreover, these
issues may shade imperceptibly into questions of the lawyer's rep-
resenting clients with conflicting interests. When a lawyer deals on
behalf of a client in a matter involving an unrepresented person, a
de facto attorney-client relationship240 may arise between the law-
yer and the unrepresented person. At that point, the lawyer is in-
volved in the de facto representation of conflicting interests. This
problem, like many others in the trusts and estates practice, arises
because of the ties that often exist between the lawyer and several
of the concerned parties.
24'
Two classic factual situations in the trust termination area
create this problem. The first is where the lawyer represents a
trustee whose performance is less than perfect. The trustee's desire
to settle the account may result in pressure on the lawyer to im-
properly induce the beneficiaries to settle.242 This situation itself
typically generates two problems worthy of discussion.
The first problem is how to protect the beneficiary from over-
reaching and from the inadequate representation that results when
a lawyer improperly represents conflicting interests.2 43 The second
is the procedural question whether a lawyer for the fiduciary may
informally submit to the beneficiary the papers initiating a judicial
accounting, or whether the lawyer must formally serve the papers
on the beneficiary.
2 4
The following example illustrates the problem of the lawyer
238. See J. RITCIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 176; see also Comment,
Considerations of Professional Responsibility in Probate Matters, 51 NEB. L. REv. 456
(1972).
239. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 115, 119. There
may also be a problem of solicitation, which is beyond the scope of this article.
240. The de facto relationship may be actual or constructive. See Johnston, supra note
223.
241. See generally PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 115.
242. See id. at 115, 120-21; J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 1382-
84; Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Par-
ties, supra note 215.
243. See infra text accompanying notes 245-47.
244. See infra note 251.
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representing a trustee who performed poorly. Assume that Lawyer
is "the family lawyer," Parent is the trustee, and Child is the trust
beneficiary. Parent-Trustee has done a poor job of investing, and,
upon termination of the trust, wants to be released without liabil-
ity and without Child becoming aware of the mismanagement. If
Child is not formally represented in the termination, what ethical
questions are presented for Lawyer? Must she look to conflict of
interest rules governing representation of multiple de facto or de
jure clients, or to the rules governing a lawyer's dealing with un-
represented persons?24 5 The thoughtful lawyer will look to both.
The best protection, however, would be for her to clarify the rela-
tionship between Lawyer and Child."
The second classic factual situation in the trust termination
area is the presentation of an irrevocable trust to the beneficiary
who has received a substantial payment of principal outright.2 4 7 To
illustrate this situation, assume that a trust is terminated in favor
of a person who is possibly still in need of trust protection. May
the lawyer for the parent of a twenty-one year old who has just
received five million dollars from a terminating trust propose a
new irrevocable trust to the beneficiary at the request of the
parent?2 "
The CPR offers little guidance in resolving ethical questions
when dealing with the unrepresented person. Canon 7, "A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the
Law," is all the CPR has to offer. Neither the Canon, nor the ECs
and DRs thereunder, offer useful guides to lawyer conduct.24 9 DR
245. In practice, it may be hard to determine when a de facto attorney-client relation-
ship has arisen. An appearance of impropriety analysis might be made under the CPR, but
not under the Model Rules.
246. See W. FISHER, supra note 13, at 43.
247. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 115, 120-23; see
also Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86, 436 N.E.2d 496, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1982).
248. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 115, 119; see
also Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86, 436 N.E.2d 496, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1982).
249. Properly diligent representation, as a goal, has a built-in problem-overzealous
representation. This is especially problematic when the opponent is unrepresented. See
Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?,
supra note 215. See generally Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When
Dealing With Opposing Parties, supra note 215. Any rule that keeps a lawyer on one side of
a dispute inevitably has the effect of encouraging litigants to hire counsel. EC 7-18 provides,
If one is not represented by counsel, a lawyer representing another may have to
deal directly with the unrepresented person; in such an instance, a lawyer should
not undertake to give advice to the person who is attempting to represent him-




7-104(A)(2) states that a lawyer shall not "[g]ive advice to a person
who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure
counsel." The Code does, however, allow some communication with
an unrepresented litigant so long as no advice is given. How much
communication it allows is unclear. For example, the simple ques-
tion whether a lawyer may informally submit pleadings or papers
to an opponent arises frequently. Yet to this day it remains uncer-
tain what the answer is under the Code.2 50 Thus, conservative law-
yers often insist on having the papers formally served on benefi-
ciaries in fiduciary accountings that are to be settled judicially.2s 1
Much of the CPR has no relevance to situations involving un-
represented persons unless it is assumed that the unrepresented
person has become a de facto client of the lawyer and is a victim of
the lawyer's mistaken representation of conflicting interests. Canon
5, "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment
on Behalf of a Client," is the primary canon dealing with such con-
flicts of interest. It seems that Canon 5 and the ECs and DRs
thereunder really are not addressed to the lawyer who deals with
the unrepresented party. Use of Canon 5 to control lawyer conduct
in this type of situation may, however, curb overreaching and over-
zealous representation. To the extent it is relevant, it has been dis-
cussed above. 52
DR 7-104(A)(2) goes on to state that a lawyer should not "[g]ive advice to a person who
is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of
such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his
client." (footnotes omitted). ,
250. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 notes (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
251. As the notes to the 1981 draft of the Model Rules state,
For example, although it is a common and often necessary practice, the pro-
priety of a lawyer's submitting papers for the approval or signature of an unrep-
resented person has been unclear. Compare ABA Formal Opinion 102 (1933)
(permissible for lawyer to draw up settlement papers in workmen's compensa-
tion dispute and submit to employee on behalf of client employer) with ABA
Informal Opinion 1255 (1972) (improper to submit a responsive pleading to un-
represented defendant in a divorce action even when accompanied by advice
that defendant seek independent counsel). The propriety of a lawyer's conduct
in such circumstances depends largely on whether it was subsequently deemed a
mere "communication" (which is proper) or implicit "advice" (which is im-
proper). Compare In re Schiff, 542 S.W.2d 771 (Mo. 1976); ABA Informal Opin-
ion 1269 (1973) (permissible to submit a form waiving issuance of summons and
entry of appearance to unrepresented defendant in divorce action) with ABA
Informal Opinion 1140 (1970) (improper to request unrepresented defendant in
domestic relations case to sign prepared form waiving issuance of summons, and
providing for voluntary submission to jurisdiction and venue).
Id. at 167.
252. See supra note 117-28 and accompanying text.
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The Model Rules address in a very abbreviated fashion the
problem of the unrepresented person. They do so in Rule 4.3,
which provides,
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not
represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that
the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasona-
bly should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands
the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
The basic goal of Rule 4.3 is to ensure that the unrepresented per-
son is aware that the lawyer is a partisan.25 s The Model Rules do
not directly address the problem of overzealous representation or
overreaching" 4 when a lawyer is dealing with an unsophisticated,
unrepresented lay opponent.
The comment to Rule 4.3 is as brief as the Rule. It too deals
solely with clarifying the lawyer's role in the mind of the unrepre-
sented person.255 To gain some understanding of how Rule 4.3 re-
lates to overreaching, one must turn to the notes following the
1981 version of Rule 4.3.
The notes state that a lawyer may communicate with an un-
represented person and that it is proper for a lawyer to submit
papers and pleadings "for the approval or signature of an unrepre-
sented person. ' 2M The notes label such a practice "common and
often necessary. 2 57 They state further that "no misconduct is pre-
sent where a lawyer provides an accurate statement of the law, or
prepares papers for settlement or trial, so long as it is made clear
that the lawyer does not act as counsel for the unrepresented per-
son or otherwise purport to advance the latter's interests."' 258 The
Model Rules thus arguably permit more interaction between an at-
torney and an unrepresented opponent than the CPR. The Model
Rules seem to allow the lawyer for the accounting trustee to deal
with the unrepresented beneficiaries in a limited but sensible fash-
ion without risking discipline for overreaching.2 5 This, however,
253. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 comment (1983).
254. But cf. id. Rule 1.2 comment (dealing with fraud).
255. See id. Rule 4.3 comment.
256. Id. Rule 4.3 notes, at 167 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
257. Id. For instance, the lawyer for the accounting trustee may wish to talk to unrep-
resented beneficiaries in order not to alienate them.
258. Id.
259. Or risking seeing the transaction set aside. See Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86,
436 N.E.2d 496, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1982).
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assumes that the notes to the 1981 version of the MRPC will prove
to be recognized as an authoritative interpretation of the Rule.
Another problem in dealing with the unrepresented benefi-
ciary is the risk that a de facto lawyer-client relationship will
arise.2 60 The Model Rules arguably lessen the risk of such an oc-
currence. A communication that, under the CPR, is tainted with
impropriety from the outset is more open to characterization as a
de facto lawyer-client relationship.2 61 A communication that can be
justified under Rule 4.3 is less open to such characterization. Thus
it may be that the Model Rules, in allowing limited communication
between the lawyer and an unrepresented opponent, reduce the
risk of a claim that a lawyer-client relationship has developed. One
hopes that lawyers who follow the notes to Rule 4.3 will find a safe
harbor.
The risk remains, however, that any communications, ap-
proved or not, will be characterized in some negative fashion. The
only sure way for a lawyer to avoid a post-settlement claim of ei-
ther de facto representation or overreaching is to interact very lit-
tle with the unrepresented beneficiary.2 62
These problems of de facto representation of clients with con-
flicting interests and of overreaching may be academic in the infor-
mal accounting situation,263 because the lawyer who advises her
trustee client to account informally probably has already con-
cluded that the trust accounting is free of problems. The benefi-
ciary who has no cause of action cannot be harmed by failing to
pursue the trustee. The lawyer who is involved in such an informal
settlement can take "risks" and deal in an informal way with the
unrepresented beneficiary. Similarly, if the blameless trustee is ac-
counting judicially because of custom or law, the lawyer can, if she
wishes, seek an informal waiver of citation. As soon as there is any
question of the propriety of the fiduciary's conduct, however, the
lawyer should deal most fastidiously with the beneficiaries and
should seriously consider a judicial accounting with formal service
of process.264
The second classic situation described above, which involves
260. See Johnston, supra note 223, at 658.
261. The communication is tainted with impropriety because it cannot be justified
under the CPR.
262. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 notes (Proposed Final Draft
1981). A third risk is that the beneficiary may claim that he never understood the nature of
any waiver of citation.
263. Fleming, supra note 72, 71.600.
264. See W. FISHER, supra note 13, at 45-48.
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presenting an irrevocable trust to the beneficiary who has received
a substantial amount of money, is a curious business.266 Hypotheti-
cally, Parent could hire Lawyer to persuade Child, a trust benefi-
ciary, to put his trust proceeds into an irrevocable trust. 6  Lawyer
could identify herself as the representative of Parent and could
say, in effect, "Junior, I am here as a lawyer for your parent with a
goal of having you sign this trust agreement that will tie up your
property in knots against your interest. I hope you will retain a
lawyer to review this. Now, let me tell you about this trust that I
have prepared. Remember, I am not your lawyer." If Child signs
the trust under these circumstances, has Lawyer overreached the
unrepresented child, or has she represented the conflicting inter-
ests of both Parent and Child?
From one point of view, there is no way Junior could conclude
that Lawyer represented him. Then, conflict of interests analysis
would seemingly be irrelevant. The problem is purely one of over-
reaching, and the Model Rules simply do not deal with the
question." '
Even with such a dramatic disclaimer, however, one could ar-
gue that Lawyer was representing Junior. That is, it might be said
that the relationship between a lawyer and the grantor of a trust is
inherently and inevitably a lawyer-client relationship, and that no
contrary characterization of the transaction could be recognized.
Then the conduct problem would be one primarily of the lawyer's
representing conflicting interests.6 8
The question whether the hypothetical situation involves over-
reaching or conflicts of interest is circular. When an unrepresented
person is overreached by a lawyer, the lawyer is implicitly giving
advice, albeit bad advice. When the lawyer gives advice to persons
with adverse interests, she is representing conflicting interests, and
the matter is then subject to a conflict of interests analysis.
If the lawyer for Parent in this situation presents a trust to
Child, it seems clear that a lawyer-client relationship arises be-
tween Lawyer and Child-Grantor. At that point, if the conduct of
265. See Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86, 436 N.E.2d 496, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1982).
266. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 115, 119, 122-
23.
267. One is then left to state law doctrines such as equitable overreaching. See J.
RrrCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 176; see also Greene v. Greene, 56
N.Y.2d 86, 436 N.E.2d 496, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1982).
268. If this is correct, then a lawyer for a charity could not approach a sophisticated




Lawyer is to be professionally responsible, she must be able to con-
clude that the representation does not run afoul of the prohibitions
against the representation of conflicting interests. The standard is
that her professional judgment not be impaired. This means that
Lawyer would have been prepared to recommend the creation of
the trust if Child had walked in off the street, and Lawyer had no
connection with Parent. Lawyer must believe Child needs the
trust.2 69 Whether or not this is the case is a function of the terms
of the particular trust.270 One certainly can imagine a wealthy
young person's wanting and needing the protection of an irrevoca-
ble trust.2 7' If the trust terms provided substantial flexibility and
access to the trust for the creator, then, in the proper circum-
stances, the trust might be desirable.7 2 If the trust suggested by
the parent is inflexible and parsimonious, however, it is one that
very few experienced lawyers would propose to clients on their own
initiative..27  Therefore, under the hypothetical circumstances, it
seems fair to conclude that the lawyer who suggests to the young
beneficiary that he create another trust runs a substantial risk of
acting in a professionally irresponsible manner, unless the trust
terms are generous and flexible.27 ' Eventhen, problems of profes-
sional responsibility may still be present. When a person is un-
happy about an irrevocable financial arrangement that he has en-
tered into with the participation of a lawyer who also represents
another person who is interested in the transaction, there is no cer-
tainty or predictability for the lawyer. 7 5 To protect herself, the
lawyer who deals with an unrepresented person should do so in the
most meticulous and ethical fashion. 7
B. Conflicts of Interest Between Lawyer and Client
2' 7
The conflicts between lawyer and client in the context of this
269. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 115, 128-29.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id. Such a trust would likely include substantial powers of invasion in the
trustee and substantial powers of appointment in the grantor.
273. See J. MANNING, ESTATE PLANNING, 110-15 (2d ed. 1982). See generally Becker,
Broad Perspective in the Development of a Flexible Estate Plan, 63 IowA L. REv. 751
(1978).
274. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 115, 128-29.
275. See Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86, 436 N.E.2d 496, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1982).
276. See PROFESSINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 115, 128-29.
277. See Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEo. L.J. 1015
(1981). See generally Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profes-
sion, supra note 24, at 1244, 1286-92.
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article include the setting of fees,278 the purchase of trust property
by the lawyer,27 e and the avoidance of costly formal procedures in
settling accounts.280
The lawyer's interest in being compensated is inevitably in
conflict with the client's pecuniary interest. 81 This is a conflict in-
herent in the lawyer-client relationship. It cannot be eliminated,
but it can be controlled. 82 Fee-related conflicts of interest are min-
imal in the trust termination area. This is a function of the system
of setting attorney's fees in trust terminations.8 3 In most jurisdic-
tions, the lawyer for an accounting trustee is not paid by the hour.
She is paid a flat fee that is a very modest percentage of the prop-
erty in the trust.284 This is presumptively reasonable and ordina-
rily need not be reviewed each time a trust is terminated.285 If a
lawyer feels she is entitled to charge a higher than ordinary fee,
then at least the possibility of overcharging exists. With fees set by
custom or law and subject to judicial scrutiny, 8' however, there is
little risk of a lawyer's unduly influencing a client to pay a higher
fee. Moreover, to the extent that the fiduciary is a sophisticated
client, the risk of undue influence decreases even further.87
278. See J. PRICE, supra note 224, § 1.15.
279. See ABA Informal Ethics Opinion C-804 (1964); J. PRICE, supra note 224, § 1.11 at
29 (citing 2 A. Scott, supra note 3, §§ 170-170.11); Ledwith, Conflict of Interest Problems
Not Limited to Actions Affecting Fiduciary Personally, 10 EST. PLAN. 22, 23 (1983).
280. See generally Westfall, supra note 35.
281. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 comment (Discussion Draft
1980).
282. See id.
283. J. PRICE, supra note 224, § 1.15. See generally Martin, supra note 24.
284. See generally Raddue, Fees & Commissions, in CALIFORNIA ESTATE ADMINISTRA-
TION § 38.2 (1959).
285. See Estate of Nazro, 15 Cal. App. 3d 318, 93 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1971).
286. See, e.g., id.
287. The CPR standard for determining whether the legal fees charged by a lawyer are
reasonable is established in DR 2-106: "A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the
facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that
the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." The Code offers eight factors in determining the
reasonableness of a fee. These factors include
. (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the'par-
ticular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;




While the fee schedule largely alleviates the problem of
overcharging in individual situations, it presents two problems of
its own. The first is the possibility of systematic overreaching.
That is, it may be said that lawyers' percentage fees for fiduciary
representation are too high and that the setting of fees in sched-
ules is simply wholesale overreaching. 8 8 The solution usually of-
fered is to require the lawyer to submit itemized bills based on an
hourly rate.2 9
The author believes that fixed percentage fees are often a
"bargain" in small trusts and estates matters and that the sug-
gested reform will serve only the wealthy. 290 The real problem is
the procedural complexity of fiduciary administration; the real so-
lution is law reform, not fee reform. If it were easier to wind up a
particular trust, then a lawyer could charge less.291
The second problem with fee schedules is the possibility that
the lawyer will devote insufficient time to the work, since the fee is
set. However, the risk of the lawyer's cutting corners is slight. The
rigidity of the formula for winding up a trust tends to divide law-
yers' work product into only two categories, competent and incom-
petent. Since no lawyer want6 to be labeled incompetent, the prob-
lem does not exist in trust terminations to the extent that it might
in other situations where there is a whole spectrum of work-prod-
uct quality.2 92
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (B)(1)-(8) (1981).
The Model Rules standard is that legal fees must be reasonable. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (a) (1983). The Rules use factors similar to those used by
the CPR in determining reasonableness. See id. Rule 1.5 comment. Therefore, if a lawyer
charges a fee that is higher than the customary fee, the fee must still be reasonable. The
lawyer would have to show that, because of factors described by the CPR or Model Rules,
such as time limitations imposed by the client requiring numerous lawyers to work on the
trust, the fee was reasonable. See also R. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS:
REGULATION AND REVIEW 28-56 (1980); Berger, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees: What is
Reasonable?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1977).
288. See J. PRICE, supra note 224, § 1.15.
289. See id.
290. The author also believes that many people confuse high-percentage contingent fees
with low-percentage estates and trusts fees.
291. See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 4, at 32. See generally Mar-
tin, supra note 24. The argument is that a fee schedule eliminates competition, with econo-
mies of efficiency and scale either not being obtained or not being passed on to the con-
sumer. One might counter with the argument that schedules prevent padding of hourly fees.
This argument may in turn be rebutted by the argument that free competition will drive out
fee padders.
292. For a lengthy discussion in another context of the ethical duty to be competent,
see Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Competent Rep-
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The second area of concern in the relationship between lawyer
and client involves purchases by the lawyer of trust property from
the trustee or purchases of distributed trust property from the
trust beneficiary. The wise and conservative lawyer does not make
such purchases. They are, however, permissible, if undesirable, so
long as the proper steps are taken.
A trustee may buy from the trust under certain conditions: (1)
all the beneficiaries must consent to the sale; (2) the trustee must
make full disclosure; (3) the trustee must not induce the sale by
taking advantage of his relationship with the beneficiaries or by
other improper conduct; and (4) the transaction must be in all re-
spects fair and reasonable.29
Under trust law, the lawyer seeking to purchase trust property
from the trustee is required to meet essentially the same require-
ments as a trustee who purchases. In addition, the lawyer must
obtain the approval of the client, i.e., the trustee, as well as of the
beneficiaries.
29 4
Rules of professional responsibility also apply. The CPR deals
with the problem of purchases from a client in DR 5-104(A), which
resentation, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 473. When a trust terminates, there is little flexibility about
when the lawyer will be paid. There is much more flexibility in the wind-up of an estate. A
lawyer will often prefer to be paid sooner, rather than later. Trust beneficiaries are often
better off if the lawyer is paid later. These conclusions are very much the case in periods
when interest rates are high or when standard trust investments are appreciating on a daily
basis. Lost interest or a lost increase can be meaningful. Moreover, the lawyer's personal
income tax planning, if the trust termination straddles two years, or the beneficiaries' tax
situation, if the final year's deductible expenditures exceed the income of the trust, can play
a role in the timing of the payment of the fees.
The resolution seems fairly straightforward. The lawyer should receive her payment at
a customary time. A lawyer does not have an affirmative obligation to put off taking a fee to
maximize post-mortem planning opportunities for the beneficiaries. Early payment to ac-
comodate the lawyer, without the informed consent of the trustee and beneficiaries, is inap-
propriate. A trustee need not keep the principal totally invested in a rising stock market, as
a matter of law, although a sophisticated trustee should make reasonable efforts to maxi-
mize beneficiary return during the period of termination.
293. 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 3, § 170.1, at 1197.
294. See id. § 170.6, at 1316: "If the trustee's attorney, acting as his advisor in the
administration of the trust, purchases trust property for himself, the sale is voidable." This
is so unless the beneficiary consents to the sale after receiving a full disclosure from the
trustee, and the sale is fair and reasonable. See id. § 170.1; see also Presbyterian Church v.
Plainfield Trust Co., 139 N.J. Eq. 501, 52 A.2d 400 (1947). In that case, the fiduciary and
the lawyer argued that the conveyance of trust property was lawful because it was negoti-
ated in good faith and because no fact within the knowledge of the lawyer that could im-
properly influence the trustee was concealed. The court recognized the standard for dealings
between lawyer and client, but found that, because the client was a fiduciary, the beneficiary
was entitled to full knowledge of the conveyance and was required to consent to it. The
court found the fairness of the price to be immaterial.
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states, "A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a
client if they have differing interests therein and if the client ex-
pects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment therein for
the protection of the client, unless the client has consented after
full disclosure.
29 5
Model Rule 1.8(a) states, "A lawyer shall not enter into a busi-
ness transaction with a client. . . unless the transaction and terms
. . . are fair and reasonable to the client. 296 The early notes under
Rule 1.8 provided that "[iln dealings with a client, the lawyer must
show that the relationship was not exploited, that the client was
fully and fairly informed of all material facts and that a full and
fair price was given. ' 297 The lawyer and the client may well have
differing interests. The CPR and the Model Rules allow the busi-
ness transaction if the lawyer discloses the ramifications of the dif-
fering interests to the client-trustee who then consents to the sale.
The safest way for a lawyer to buy from a trustee is with prior
judicial approval upon notice and full disclosure to the benefi-
ciaries, with some mechanism (such as an independent appraisal)
to ensure the fairness and reasonableness 'of the price, and without
impropriety.29 Similarly, if the lawyer wishes to purchase a former
trust asset after the distribution of the asset to the beneficiary,
ethics must be considered. If the beneficiary is a client, then the
immediately preceding ethical analysis applies.299
295. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(A) (1981).
296. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule L.8(a)(1) (1983).
297. Id. Rule 1.8 notes, at 61 (Proposed Final Draft 1981); see Spencer v. Nelson, 73
Cal. App. 3d 68, 238 P.2d 169 (1951).
Occasionally circumstances are such that a lawyer seeks to purchase a trust asset before
obtaining judicial approval, with the hope that the court will approve the act after it has
taken place. See 2 A. Scorr, supra note 3, § 170.7. A court may retroactively approve a sale
if the sale appears to be in the best interest of the trust estate. The trustee is taking the
risk, however, that the court will not approve. If the court does not approve, then both
trustee and lawyer are implicated. Although it is theoretically acceptable, it is unwise to
pursue such a course of action. The risk is substantial that the lawyer's desire to make the
purchase will cause the lawyer to provide the trustee with poor advice. A potential conflict
exists between the lawyer's own interests and the interests of the client trustee.
298. An ex parte judicially approved sale is not acceptable under either the CPR or the
Model Rules. In the discussion in the text, both full disclosure in judicial proceedings and
notice substitute for informed beneficiary consent.
299. If the beneficiary is a former client of the lawyer (former, perhaps, because the
trust termination is concluded and there is no ongoing lawyer-client relationship between
them), then the analysis arguably remains the same. It is reasonable to assume that the
same standards apply when a lawyer purchases property from a former client as when she
purchases property from a present client. The lawyer must show that the relationship was
not exploited, that the client was fully and fairly informed of all material facts, and that a
fair price was given. See Spencer v. Nelson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 68, 238 P.2d 169 (1951). The
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If the beneficiary was never a client, then the following analy-
sis is appropriate. There must be no confusion in the mind of the
beneficiary as to the relationship between himself and the lawyer.
This may be difficult to establish, given the lawyer's prior repre-
sentation of the trustee. If it is established that there never was an
attorney-client relationship, then the only ethical restrictions on
the lawyer's conduct are those relating to overreaching and, under
the CPR the appearance of impropriety. 00 Any determination of
misconduct will be based on the individual facts and
circumstances.
The third area of potential attorney-client conflict is that of
avoiding costly formalities in terminating a trust. This may be pos-
sible in very limited circumstances. Assume a jurisdiction where
informal accountings are customary.301 These accountings consist
of an extensive fiduciary account 0 2 and a document called a re-
ceipt and release 03 prepared by the lawyer and presented to the
competent adult beneficiaries. The lawyer usually accepts a tradi-
tional percentage fee for presiding over such a termination. 04 Im-
plicit in the transaction is an opinion by the lawyer that the ac-
count and the receipt and release provide the trustee with
complete protection from later liability. The lawyer probably never
tells the trustee-client that there is a much cheaper, if much risk-
ier, way to handle the termination-the trustee can simply turn
the assets over to the beneficiary with copies of whatever records
happen to be available and obtain the beneficiary's signature on a
printed form release. 5
Is it ethical for a lawyer to offer only the formal, either judicial
or nonjudicial, method of termination to a client? Obviously, trust-
ees who are related to the beneficiary might be willing to risk being
successfully sued at a later date if the savings in legal fees were to
go to the beneficiary.
At this time, the author does not see an ethical obligation to
advise trustees of this alternative. The risks to the trustee would
be hard to explain to many clients. Should the beneficiary later
decide to sue the trustee, the risk to the lawyer that this might be
courts would still be very concerned with the appearance of impropriety and overreaching.
300. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1981).
301. See J. PRICE, supra note 224, § 4.24, at 204.
302. See NATIONAL FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS PROJECT, supra note 163.
303. See supra note 204.
304. See generally Raddue, supra note 284, § 38.2.
305. See generally Limiting Future Actions After Trust Account Approval, supra note
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found to be malpractice would be substantial.0 6 It is at least argu-
able that the informal "settlement" does not meet the minimum
standard of competent practice.307 A lawyer has an obligation to
provide competent advice,30 8 and need not risk malpractice
liability.309
V. A HYPOTHETICAL: THE TRUSTEE WHO IS A BENEFICIARY
A concluding hypothetical situation can best illustrate the ap-
plication of the rules to the complex reality that faces the lawyer in
trust terminations. Dealing with the trustee who has an inherent
conflict of interest (typically, a trustee who is also a beneficiary) is
one of the more perplexing problems in the trust and estates prac-
tice. The substantive law is troublesome, 310 so it should come as no
surprise that the associated ethical questions are problematic as
well.3 1
A trustee owes an absolute obligation of loyalty to his benefi-
ciaries,3 12 but the law also allows a trustee to be one of the benefi-
ciaries.313 When a beneficiary is a trustee, conflicts of interest are
often inherent in the situation. The law tolerates the conflicts as
long as there is no breach of the various duties of a trustee, the
chief of these being the duty of impartiality. 3 4
The settlor may greatly expand the powers of the beneficiary-
trustee. Within certain limits, the settlor may specifically allow the
beneficiary-trustee to act in ways that benefit him and to derive a
personal benefit from his acts. Without the settlor's authorization,
306. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVI, supra note 17, §§ 620-627.
307. See id. § 627; Johnston, supra note 223, at 629.
308. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983). Similar problems
might arise if a trustee wanted a full, but informal, accounting in a jurisdiction where all
accountings were required to be judicial.
309. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 17, § 627; Johnston, supra note 223, at 629.
310. See Bank of Nevada v. Speirs, 95 Nev. 870, 603 P.2d 1074 (1979).
311. There are some classic family situations that seem to be breeding grounds for such
problems. One occurs where the father dies and the son is put in charge of the family busi-
ness or family farm and is made trustee for the widow and daughter. The trusts are inevita-
bly part-owners of the business. Two typical breaches of trust arising out of this situation
are of interest to us. The first is where the son runs the business "into the ground." The
second is where the business prospers, and the son diverts business opportunities to himself
or diverts corporate assets to himself in the guise of employee compensation and the like.
Another classic situation occurs where there is a second wife who is a trustee for the
children of the first marriage. The children of the prior marriage are often given short shrift
by their stepmother-trustee.
312. A. LORING, supra note 33, § 20.
313. 2 A. Scorr, supra note 3, §§ 99-99.5, 115.
314. Id. § 183; 3 id. § 232.
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such acts would constitute a breach of trust.15 Settlors (as advised
by their lawyers) often fail to include provisions authorizing the
beneficiary-trustee to act in his own self-interest.3 16 Even when
they do include such provisions, however, settlors may not go be-
yond certain limits and may not sanction breaches of trust, which
are against public policy.3 17 Ordinarily, however, the powers given
a particular trustee are less than the full range permitted. Thus, to
discuss meaningfully conflicts of interest and breach of trust in a
given situation, one must know the powers granted to the benefi-
ciary-trustee by the instrument and by local law. It is only with
respect to the specific powers given to a particular beneficiary-trus-
tee that one can characterize his conduct as proper or improper.
Let us assume the beneficiary-trustee has acted in a way
clearly benefiting himself. Depending on the circumstances, that
conduct may fall anywhere on a continuum that ranges from obvi-
ously proper conduct to a clear breach of trust. The author sees
four artificial, but useful, categories on the continuum. They are
(1) conduct that is proper even though it may benefit the benefi-
ciary-trustee; (2) a "gray area" comprising conduct as to which a
lawyer could not predict an outcome in litigation; (3) another "gray
area" comprising conduct as to which a lawyer may believe there is
a meaningful chance of providing the beneficiary with a remedy;
and (4) conduct that seems clearly to be a breach of trust and that
should therefore lead to a remedy.
When the trustee is disinterested, and others besides the trus-
tee rely on the lawyer, ethical problems exist only when the trus-
tee's performance is less than adequate. When the trustee is also a
beneficiary, however, almost any action carries a potential for con-
flict of interest. The possibility that the lawyer will find herself
improperly representing conflicting interests expands dramatically.
Conflicts of interest for the trustee are inherent in his dual role.
And, if the beneficiary-trustee's inherent conflict is not properly
resolved each time he acts, then the lawyer is faced with her own
professional conflicts of interest. Without care on the lawyer's part,
the trustee's conflicts of interest can ensnare the lawyer."' 8
315. See CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WILL DRAFTING
PRACTICE § 13.45 (1982).
316. See Mueller v. Mueller, 28 Wis. 2d 26, 135 N.W.2d 854 (1965). The irony is that
one is often left with the feeling that the creator of the trust would have wanted the trustee
to act in the "improper" fashion that leads to liability. Nonetheless, the law does not vindi-
cate the possible intent of the settlor in such situations.
317. See Wood v. Honeyman, 178 Or. 484, 169 P.2d 131 (1946).
318. Imagine what happens when beneficiaries, corporate and individual trustees, the
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Most of these questions involve conflicts of interest among
multiple clients and are thus an extension of the analysis in the
preceding section.3 19 Secondarily, to the 'extent that the lawyer
does not approve of the client-beneficiary-trustee's conduct, ques-
tions of terminating the representation and informing the other
beneficiaries of the trustee's actions may also arise. 20
A simple example may prove useful. We can vary it as the
need arises. Let us assume that a trust is about to terminate. Upon
its termination, two-thirds of the trust corpus is to go to brother
John and one-third is to go to his sister Sally. The trust has
$300,000 in assets invested in publicly traded securities. John, the
sole trustee, plans to put the publicly traded securities into a pri-
vate holding company having 300 shares of stock. John would re-
ceive 200 shares of the stock of the private holding company and
Sally would receive 100 shares, giving John control. This is signifi-
cantly different from Sally's receiving a pro rata share of a portfo-
lio of publicly traded securities. 21
Let us also assume that Lawyer represents both John and
Sally as the "family"3 2 lawyer. The ethical problems confronting
Lawyer as the trustee's attorney vary depending upon the trustee's
powers and upon whether or not Sally is aware of this proposed
action. If Sally is aware of John's plan and protests the action,
Lawyer faces an immediate conflict of interest. The alternatives of
continued representation (insofar as permitted), intermediation,
and required withdrawal have been discussed above. 23 If Sally is
unaware of John's plan, Lawyer faces a different problem. Lawyer
must weigh her duty to maintain John's client confidences against
the exceptions to the duty3 24 and the rules permitting voluntary
withdrawal in the face of unsavory client conduct.325
Let us examine these problems under the assumption that
Sally does not know about the trustee's proposed plan. The charac-
terization of John's actions, and thus of Lawyer's duty, depends on
state law and the terms of the trust. In a "standard" trust in which
John is given no special administrative powers and is released from
board and officers of the family business, and the pension trustee of the same business all
look to one lawyer for advice. The permutations and combinations are mind-boggling.
319. See supra notes 112-276 and accompanying text.
320. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1983).
321. See Hillyard v. Leonard, 391 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. 1965).
322. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 17, § 623.
323. See supra notes 112-237 and accompanying text.
324. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
325. See id. Rule 1.16.
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no duties, it seems reasonably clear that absent the approval of
Sally$2 e the proposed recasting of the trust portfolio immediately
prior to termination would be a breach of trust.
27
If the trustee is given very broad, boilerplate powers to deal
with the trust portfolio, but no specific power to form a holding
company of the sort mentioned, then the presence of impropriety
would be less evident. John's actions would likely still constitute a
breach, however, because the action is unusual and because it de-
prives Sally of the full benefit of unfettered ownership of liquid
assets.281 If the instrument specifically enpowered the trustee to
take such action, the action would be perfectly legitimate, 8 9 and
most courts probably would not then prohibit the creation of the
holding company.8 0
Let us now change the hypothetical and discuss the trustee's
actions in three different contexts: (1) where neither Sally nor any
other beneficiary or trustee is also relying on Lawyer, who we know
is representing John as trustee; (2) where Sally is relying on Law-
yer; and (3) where there is a co-trustee relying on Lawyer.
When no other parties are relying on the trustee's lawyer,
there are two considerations: the lawyer's duty to inform the bene-
ficiary, and the lawyer's following her own conscience and
resigning.
Let us now assume that John is the sole trustee and Lawyer's
only client in the matter. If Lawyer has no other de jure or de facto
client, then she is not faced with any conflicting interest. The only
ethical question is whether or not she has a duty to inform those
who will possibly be harmed by her client's less-than-scrupulous
acts. That is, does Lawyer have a duty to inform Sally, who is not
a client, of John's plan? Under the CPR, Lawyer has no duty to
inform the harmed beneficiary. The CPR's general rule that a law-
yer shall not knowingly reveal a confidence or secret of a client
326. Sally would obviously be unwise to give her approval.
327. See Hillyard v. Leonard, 391 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. 1965).
328. See id.
329. An example of such authorizing language might read,
There is a tradition in my family of holding publicly traded securities in holding
companies. I specifically authorize my trustee, prior to the termination of this
trust, to see to the creation of such an investment vehicle and to the distribution
of shares in that corporation upon the termination of the trust, even if it leaves a
trust beneficiary a minority shareholder in such a holding company.
330. Trustee actions that are permissible under a "standard" trust-which is least lib-
eral in its grant of powers-are automatically permissible under the other less restrictive
instruments, as well. Thus if the action is not a breach under standard powers, then it is not




There are only two exceptions to the CPR rule. They deal with
criminal or fraudulent conduct by a client. Since John's conduct is
neither, the exceptions do not apply.3 3 2 Nor, under the CPR, does
Lawyer have a duty to inform the court of the activity."
The result in the example is the same under the Model Rules.
Rule 1.6(a) states substantially the same general rule as the CPR
with respect to this situation-that a lawyer shall not reveal infor-
mation relating to the representation of a client without the cli-
ent's consent.33 4 For purposes of this article, Rule 1.6(b)(1) also
states substantially the same exception as the CPR-the lawyer
may reveal information about a client to prevent him from com-
mitting a crime that is likely to result in death or substantial in-
jury to the person of another." Again, the trustee's proposed act
331. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLIrY DR 4-101(B)(1) (1981). "'Confi-
dence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable laws
and 'secret' refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client
has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
be likely to be detrimental to the client." Id. DR 4-101(A).
332. DR 4-101(C) provides an exception to the general rule that a lawyer must preserve
client confidences. The rule allows a lawyer to reveal the intention of the client to commit a
crime. In the hypothetical situation, the trustee-beneficiary's conduct does not constitute a
crime. The other exception to the rule of preservation of client confidences is DR 7-
102(B)(1). It states that a lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that the cli-
ent, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person shall reveal the
fraud to the affected person except when the information is privileged. The proposed action
of the trustee-beneficiary does not constitute a tortious fraud, and therefore the exception
does not apply either. Also, DR 7-102(B) has been construed to apply only to past frauds.
See Callan & Davis, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclos-
ure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976).
333. See supra note 332. Two ethics opinions provide that the lawyer may not reveal
client confidences to the court even when the client has misappropriated funds from a
ward's trust. The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, in Informal
Opinion 778 (1907), provided that when a lawyer has been informed by his client that the
client guardian has misappropriated funds from the trust, the lawyer has no duty to report
the misappropriation to the court and should not do so without client consent. The Com-
mittee stated that the lawyer should do everything in his power to see that his client makes
full restitution and informs the court of his own misconduct. The Committee also stated
that if the client did not make restitution the lawyer should resign from the representation.
Los Angeles County Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics Opinion 267 (1960)
also dealt with a lawyer who was informed that his client misappropriated funds from a
ward's trust. The Committee stated that the lawyer had no duty to inform the court and
should not reveal the information to the court. The Committee recommended that the law-
yer seek to have the client rectify the misappropriation and prepare a true account. Indeed,
the lawyer may not inform either the beneficiaries or the court, because this would violate
an ethical obligaiton, and the attorney could be subject to discipline for failure to comply
with his duty to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client.
334. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983).
335. See id. Rule 1.6(b)(1). There are significant differences between the CPR and the
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of forming a holding company does not constitute a crime. There-
fore, Lawyer may not reveal the information to the beneficiary or
to the court. Rule 4.1(b) imposes on the lawyer an affirmative duty
of disclosure to third parties. It applies only to crime and fraud,
however, and so has no application to the trustee's conduct in the
example. 8
Under both the CPR and the Model Rules, a lawyer has an
affirmative duty to inform the client if she believes that the propo-
sal is improper and unwise, even if it is not illegal or morally
wrong. If the action is arguably or clearly proper, then the lawyer
certainly has no problems of professional responsibility."' 7
Let us consider the second context-the situation in which
Sally, another beneficiary, relies on Lawyer, who also represents
John, the beneficiary-trustee. Reiterating, John, as beneficiary-
trustee, plans a holding company. Lawyer represents John and
Sally. Sally does not know about John's plan. The powers granted
by the trust are not broad enough to allow the holding company.
That is, the action would likely be a breach of John's fiduciary
duty.
Since Lawyer represents, de jure or de facto, another benefi-
ciary, as well as the beneficiary-trustee, Lawyer is representing
conflicting interests and must consider whether or not it is proper
to inform the affected client, Sally, of the intended imposition by
John. Lawyer must also decide whether or not she has to withdraw.
At this point, the situation changes significantly. Any harm that
flows from the conduct of the beneficiary-trustee impinges upon
another client of the lawyer and not upon third party.
Lawyer's first duty is to offer wise counsel-to try to dissuade
Model Rules. These differences, however, do not affect the subject discussed. The proposed
action of the beneficiary-trustee to create a private holding company does not constitute a
crime, so Rule 1.6(b)(2) does not allow the lawyer to reveal the information to the benefi-
ciaries or the court.
336. See generally Crystal, supra note 129.
337. EC 7-5 states, "A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving his
professional opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of the
courts on the matter at hand. . . ." EC 7-8 states, "A lawyer should exert his best efforts to
insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has been informed of rele-
vant considerations. . . . Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely
legal considerations. . . . [I]t is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which
may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible." (footnote omitted).
Model Rule 1.2(e) states, "When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permit-
ted by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client
regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct." Also, Rule 2.1 states that "in
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations iuch as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."
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John. " If Lawyer fails to dissuade John, then Lawyer has conflict-
ing duties. The duty to preserve John's confidences339 conflicts
with the duty adequately to represent Sally 40 and with the duty to
keep Sally fully informed of matters affecting her affairs.34 The
CPR and the Model Rules permit and compel a lawyer to disclose
client conduct that is criminal or (under the CPR) fraudulent. The
trustee's proposed action does not fall within either category; it
constitutes only an abuse of discretion.
3 42
It appears that Lawyer is obliged to resign from the represen-
tation of both clients without revealing John's plans to Sally. "
Continuing the representation would force Lawyer to breach a
duty to one of the two clients. Lawyer may not continue to re-
present either one because, as discussed above, this would involve
opposing a former client under inappropriate circumstances. s" Af-
ter Lawyer withdraws, we must assume that Sally will be protected
by the adversary system. 45
338. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983).
339. See id. Rule 1.6.
340. See id. Rule 1.1.
341. See id. Rule 1.4.
342. Any analysis applicable to a clear abuse of discretion situation will also cover the
cases involving lesser evils.
343. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1983).
344. See supra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
345. If Lawyer's advice is ignored, may Lawyer withdraw without the client's approval?
DR 2-110(C)(1) permits a lawyer, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, to withdraw
from representation where the client insists that the lawyer engage in conduct that is con-
trary to the lawyer's judgment and advice but not prohibited by the Disciplinary Rules.
EC 7-8 states, "In the event that the client in a nonadjudicatory matter insists upon a
course of conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohib-
ited by Disciplinary Rules, the lawyer may withdraw from employment." The hypothetical
does not involve a matter pending before a tribunal. The proposed act will be shown in the
final account, which has not been prepared and which is not before a court. Therefore, the
lawyer may withdraw.
Under the Model Rules, the lawyer may resign if the withdrawal can be accomplished
without a material adverse effect on the interests of the client. Under the comment to Rule
4.3, she may even be obliged to resign. That comment reads,
An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with
legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a
disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. Dur-
ing the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer should not give
advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to obtain counsel.
The Model Rules allow a lawyer to resign from representation without cause if the
withdrawal will not prejudice the client. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.16(b) (1983). The 1981 version of Model Rule 1.2(c) allowed a lawyer to withdraw if a
client insisted upon an objective that the lawyer considered repugnant or imprudent, pro-
vided she could do so without material adverse effect on the interests of the client. See id.
Rule 1.2(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
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Now let us examine the third context, in which John has a co-
trustee who is not a beneficiary, but who is also represented by
Lawyer. For simplicity's sake, assume that no other trust benefi-
ciary (Sally) is a client of Lawyer. 4"
John again plans his holding company under a trust instru-
ment giving him only standard fiduciary powers. This is likely to
be a breach of duty. 3 7 Lawyer's conflict of interest problems, if
any, are a function of several things: (1) how much Co-trustee
knows about the proposed action by John, (2) to what extent Co-
trustee appreciates the legal consequences of the proposed act, and
(3) whether or not Co-trustee agrees to the action.
Assume first that Co-trustee is completely unaware of the pro-
posed action. Since John cannot act without Co-trustee's con-
sent, 48 Co-trustee must learn of John's plan before it can be im-
plemented. Therefore, Lawyer does not face a problem of
informing as much as she faces a matter of professional etiquette.
John should be the one to tell Co-trustee, though Lawyer certainly
The CPR deals, in EC 9-2, with the duty to inform the second client, which states that
"a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material developments in the mat-
ters being handled for the client." See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-8 (1981). Model Rule 1.4(b) states, "[A] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation."
As to the duty to resign, the CPR requires in DR 5-105(B) that where multiple clients'
interests differ in a meaningful way, "[a] lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if
the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of his client will be or is
likely to be adversely affected." Model Rule 1.7 would also require resignation. Prior to such
resignation, the lawyer has a right and a duty to seek to dissuade the aggressive client from
the planned abuse of discretion. Under both the CPR and the Model Rules, the lawyer must
resign once it is clear that she cannot arrange an accommodation of interests, and may not
represent either party.
346. It is quite common for creators of trusts to appoint more than one trustee. See H.
TwEED & W. PARSONS, LIFETIME AND TESTAMENTARY ESTATE PLANNING 129 (8th ed. 1978).
Typically, multiple trustees share duties equally, although sometimes trustees' duties are
separated, with specific trustees given specific duties. For example, a bank might make all
financial decisions, while a family member might make decisions regarding distributions. Or
a bank might perform all ministerial duties, e.g., recordkeeping and tax returns, an invest-
ment adviser might choose all investments, and a family member might make decisions re-
garding disbursements of income and principal.
Each trustee is entitled to his own lawyer. If there are multiple lawyers, custom or
statute may limit the total legal fees paid to all the lawyers. Nonetheless, multiple lawyers
will often collect more total fees than would one lawyer. It is common, however, for multiple
trustees to retain one lawyer-usually the drafter of the instrument. That lawyer is typically
best acquainted with the situation and is the obvious choice of the trustees. An ethical law-
yer may properly accept such a representation. Initially, the trustees have a common cause,
and there is no expectation of conflict.
347. See Hillyard v. Leonard, 391 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. 1965).
348. See A. LORING, supra note 33, § 30, at 101.
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may urge John to tell Co-trustee sooner rather than later.
Assume secondly that Co-trustee knows about the proposed
plan but does not appreciate its legal ramifications, and so is pre-
pared to agree to the action. Then Lawyer can and should advise
Co-trustee of the impropriety of the proposal. Lawyer has an obli-
gation to Co-trustee to do this. So advising Co-trustee is not dis-
loyal to John, because Lawyer has an obligation to keep her cli-
ents, including Co-trustee, informed of facts and circumstances
affecting their representation." 9 Also, this is not a breach of Law-
yer's duty to preserve John's confidences, because John and Co-
trustee are engaged in a common venture with a common
goal-the orderly administration and proper termination of the
trust. John's plan has no place in that scheme. While John might
have a right of confidentiality as to the rest of the world, John
cannot possibly have a protectable confidential interest in Co-trus-
tee's not knowing about a proposal that might well subject them
both to liability. 50 Co-trustee is entitled to understand the propo-
sal and its legal ramifications.
Assume finally that Co-trustee knows about the proposed ac-
tions, appreciates its ramifications, and opposes the plan. So long
as Co-trustee stands his ground, Lawyer has no problem of profes-
sional responsibility. Joint action is required to create the holding
company.35' John's proposal is forestalled by Co-trustee's refusal to
agree to the plan. The co-trustees have several alternative courses
of action, and when they have decided what course to follow, Law-
yer can implement their decision.
If the two trustees cannot agree, they must go to court for in-
structions.3 52 They now have opposing cases to make to a judge.
Although they may not be denominated plaintiff and defendant,
349. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-2 (1981).
350. EC 7-8 states, "A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his
client are made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations." EC 9-2
states that "a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material developments
in the matters being handled for the client." The Model Rules make the duty to keep the
client informed even more explicit in Rule 1.4(b): "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation." In the earlier notes to Rule 1.4, the Committee stated that a lawyer should
inform the client of possible adverse consequences that may arise from the execution of an
agreement. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 notes, at 30. Therefore, it
seems clear that Lawyer owes Co-trustee the duty of informing him of John's proposed con-
duct, which constitutes an abuse of discretion.
351. See A. LORING, supra note 33, § 30, at 101.
352. See id.
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they surely are opponents and cannot be represented by one law-
yer. '53 Also, it is likely that Lawyer would not be permitted to re-
present either one of the trustees in the request for instructions. 54
Now assume that the co-trustees are acting under broader
fiduciary powers, but that the trust instrument still falls short of
clearly authorizing the holding company. Assume that the local law
of the jurisdiction makes the plan questionable and somewhat
risky. If Co-trustee does not appreciate the legal ramifications of
the plan, Lawyer, as above, must see that Co-trustee comes to un-
derstand.3 55 And if Co-trustee knows the legal problems and the
two trustees cannot agree, then the analysis in the preceding para-
graph would apply. Finally, if the instrument authorizes formation
of the holding company, then no new problems of professional re-
sponsibility arise.
85 6
To summarize, when atrustee is also a beneficiary of the trust,
and when there are other trustees or beneficiaries with different
interests, then the exercise of the trustee's managerial powers can
sometimes create serious ethical problems for the trustee's lawyer.
Expansive drafting of the trust document can broaden the trus-
tee's powers and the range of permissible acts. Eliminating some
duties may give the trustee freedom to act in ways that would oth-
353. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
354. See id.
355. See id. Rule 1.4.
356. One can imagine trustees who do not know what to do, but who have no quarrel.
They are simply baffled. Then their lawyer might well be able to petition for instructions for
them both. The court would certainly require notice to all beneficiaries in order to obtain
briefing from all affected viewpoints.
The hypothetical given in the text assumes a situation in which the parties concerned
are aware of the full ramifications of the proposed action. The trustees must agree on an
action before it can properly be taken. If Co-trustee opposes the action, then they have not
yet decided. If the inability to act is a function of Co-trustee's uncertainty as to the propri-
ety of their action or their power to act, a court may aid in construing the instrument or
determining the relevant rule of law. See In re Estate of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 401
N.Y.S.2d 449, 372 N.E.2d 291 (1977). If a court believes the trustees are refusing to perform
their fiduciary function, a court may refuse to grant instructions. See id. If the trustees
become totally deadlocked, the court may appoint a third trustee or seek the resignation of
the deadlocked trustees. In the alternative, the court may give instructions as to the best
method of administration. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 554 (rev. 2d ed. 1980). The Iowa Probate Code section 633.76 requires that co-trustees
concur on the exercise of trust powers. If they cannot agree, they may apply to the court,
which will make such orders as it deems proper. See IowA CODE ANN. § 633.76 (West 1964).
If both trustees know the conflict exists, the lawyer has no loyalty or conflict of interest
problem as to informing the other trustee. The lawyer may simply advise the clients on
what she understands the law to be. Indeed, the lawyer may seek to intermediate between
the two clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1983).
[Vol. 38:1
TRUST TERMINATIONS
erwise constitute a breach of trust. 67 In certain situations of
starkly adverse interests, the lawyer may be forced to withdraw.
357. This freedom may allow the trustee to advance his own situation in trust adminis-
tration without fear of liability. A conflict of interest may still remain, however, even though
it is not actionable. It is possible to imagine drafting where even the conflicts of interest
would be eliminated. For example, "I direct my beneficiary-trustee to exercise all adminis-
trative powers in his own favor since he is the primary object of my bounty." Except as
limited by public policy, this language would be effective.
It is interesting to consider the following hypothetical situation under Model Rule 1.9.
Assume that Bank and Trustee are co-trustees. Lawyer represents them as co-fiduciaries.
Beneficiary discovers an impropriety in the administration and sues Bank and Trustee. The
impropriety was such that Bank is primarily liable. What are Lawyer's options and con-
flicts? Can she represent both clients, either client, or must she withdraw completely? The
problem can be analyzed in two ways. The problem can be viewed as one involving lawyer
representation of two co-defendants. The two clients have adverse interests, however, be-
cause they have inconsistent defenses. This presents a classic conflict of interest for the
lawyer.
Model Rule 1.7 seemingly requires that one lawyer not represent both co-trustees. The
same result ensues under the CPR. DR 5-105 requires that an attorney decline or withdraw
from employment that would involve her in the representation of divergent interests. See
Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interests in the Legal Profession, supra note 24, at
1244, 1293.
The next question is whether Lawyer could represent one of the clients. If she does, the
client no longer represented becomes a former client. Then, Model Rule 1.9 states that a
lawyer may not represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter if the
interest of that person is materially adverse to the interest of the former client. In this
situation, the representation derives from the same matter. Thus Rule 1.9 would be disposi-
tive: Lawyer may not continue to represent either.
Model Rule 1.9 also states that a lawyer may not make use of confidential information
to the disadvantage of the former client while representing a present client. It is likely that
the lawyer in the hypothetical situation could have obtained information from Bank that
would be adverse to its interest if Lawyer used that information in representing Trustee.
The prohibition of the rules may be waived if both parties consent to Lawyer's continu-
ing to represent one of them. Consent would be required in this case because of the confi-
dential information and because of the adverse interests of the two parties deriving from the
same matter. Although Trustee might conceivably consent to Lawyer's representing Bank, it
is not likely that Bank would consent to Lawyer's representation of Trustee.
The problem may also be analyzed as one in which Lawyer was retained by two parties
with potentially conflicting interests. The standard wisdom is that, should the potential con-
flict develop into an actual conflict, the attorney must withdraw from representing either
client and advise them to seek separate counsel. See Developments in the Law-Conflicts of
Interest in the Legal Profession, supra note 24, at 1310.
However, there may be circumstances in which the attorney could represent one of
them. The most obvious is where the clients consent. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rules 1.7(a), 1.9(a) (1983). Representing one of the clients would again create the
former- and present-client relationship discussed above. Any agreement would necessarily
involve formal consent and a waiver of rights to object to the conflict.
To summarize, conflicts between fiduciaries are usually fairly straightforward and stark,
and therefore are easy to deal with. It ordinarily becomes clear at some point that the
fiduciaries must have independent counsel and that the family lawyer who has represented
the trustees must withdraw. At that point, a bank is likely to turn to its own general counsel
for representation, the other trustee to another lawyer, and the beneficiaries to yet a third
lawyer. The family lawyer who has done most of the day-to-day representation of the
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VI. CONCLUSION
Numerous conflicts of interest arise for the lawyer in the
trusts and estates practice; many of them arise upon trust termina-
tions. Trust terminations take place in a wide variety of situations
that must be analyzed separately to determine what conflicts of
interest are present.
These conflicts present themselves in a variety of ways. They
emerge out of the characteristics of each situation, which include
multiple de facto or de jure client relationships, the customary
ways that the fiduciary selects a lawyer, the special relationship
between trustee and beneficiary, and the often close ties that exist
between settlor, lawyer, trustee, and beneficiaries. Trust termina-
tions can be especially complex because of the fiduciary relation-
ships that are always present and the family relationships that are
often present. Moreover, the lawyer often is involved with settlor,
trustee, and beneficiaries.
The complexity is compounded by the presence of competing
policies: the resolution of disputes within an adversary system that
assigns to each interested party a loyal advocate; the efficient ter-
mination of trusts in a era of crowded judicial calendars; the grow-
ing public perception that transactions are overlawyered; and re-
pose in disputes, especially in the type of family situations that are
often found in the trust context.
One lawyer theoretically may represent multiple parties with
conflicting interests under limited circumstances. Nonetheless,
traditional notions of advocacy and adversity quickly lead to the
hiring of additional lawyers when the risk of disloyalty or the loss
of independent judgment becomes significant. It is easy to under-
stand the call for more lawyers. The lawyer's task is so much sim-
pler if she represents only one client in a matter. Dealing with
multiple clients in a conflict of interest situation is difficult. The
lawyer must first know the substantive law and the facts of the
particular representation. She must also know the ethical rules
governing conflicts of interest. She must use those rules in making
a threshold decision as to the propriety of the dual representation.
And she must constantly recalculate the continuing propriety of
the initial decision to undertake the representation.
Many situations require additional lawyers. Traditional policy
goals of the adversary system frequently are considered most im-
fiduciaries presumably would be entitled to substantial compensation for that work, and
perhaps could participate in the uncontested aspects of the wind-up of the trust.
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portant. The script for the adversary scenario requires each actor
in the drama to hire his own lawyer. We should, however, resist the
temptation to participate in that drama. The involvement of more
lawyers in a situation may be socially unwholesome because of the
added cost and complexity and because it may engender the per-
ception that lawyers' ethics encourage the hiring of unnecessary
extras.
The questions considered in this article are complex. Despite
the complexity of the issues and the diversity of disparate fact sit-
uations, however, the lawyer is aided by common sense, by an un-
derstanding of what is fair, by a fastidious approach to problems of
conflicts of interest, and by a close analysis of the factors involved
in each situation. There are no easy answers, but conscientious
lawyers should be able to avoid disloyalty and loss of independent
professional judgment, even in the maze of family and fiduciary
relationships so often found in the trusts practice.
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APPENDIX
The following charts set forth, in simplified fashion, treatment
of conflicts of interest under the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity and under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. It is the
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OPPOSING PRESENT AND FORMER CLIENTS
Client Related Representation Unrelated Representation
Relation-
ship
CPR MRPC CPR MRPC
Present Never Never Never
Client EC 5-15 Rule 1.7 DR 5-105(A-C)
DR 5-105 Comment to
1.7
Former Never ** Yes Yes
Client EC 4-6 EC 4-6 Rule 1.7
DR 5-105(A-C) DR 5-105(A-C)
Canon 9
* Not if directly adverse or materially limits lawyer's indepen-
dence without lawyer's reasonable belief and client consent. Rule
1.7; Comment to 1.7.
** Not if the representation is substantially related and materially
adverse. Rule 1.9.
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